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Abstract 
 
Objectives 
The objective of this thesis is to examine word of mouth advice and its relationship with 
product sales and market shares in the context of the smartphone market. The thesis aims to 
determine the key properties of valuable word of mouth advice from a consumer’s perspective 
and seeks to identify the effects of sources and transmission methods on the valuation of word 
of mouth advice. Furthermore, the thesis aims to clarify the market wide effects of positive 
word of mouth on product market shares through empirical analysis of the effects of word of 
mouth advice on operation system market shares in the smartphone market. 
 
Framework, data and methods 
The methodology of the thesis is based on building a framework for empirical analysis by 
reviewing relevant literature on social learning and word of mouth advice and subsequently 
examining the individual level effects, as well as the market wide effects, of word of mouth 
advice though empirical analysis of smartphone market related data. The data utilized for the 
empirical analysis section of the thesis consists of two datasets including survey questionnaire 
responses and sales figures of smartphone handsets in various markets. The empirical 
methods utilized in analyzing the datasets include the Heckman selection model as well as the 
ordinary least squares method, the fixed effects estimation method and the random effects 
estimation method. 
 
Findings 
The main findings of this thesis are that, in terms of the determinants of valuable advice, the 
effectiveness of word of mouth is highly correlated with the strength of the social tie between 
the advice giver and the receiver of the advice. A closer social tie implies a higher rating for 
the advice received. Other factors contributing positively towards a high probability of a high 
valuation for advice are active search for advice and the receiver’s familiarity with the subject 
of advice. Also, a variety of socio-economic factors such as gender and the place of residence 
of the respondent were found to result in in a higher probability for favorable ratings for 
advice. 
 
In addition to this, in terms of the market wide effects of positive word of mouth, the thesis 
finds strong correlation between high shares positive word of mouth and high market shares 
for smartphone operation systems. The findings however experience large variations across 
markets and more research will be required to completely uncover the nature of the 
relationship between word of mouth and product sales. While the type of herd behavior 
implied by social learning theories certainly seems possible as a real world market outcome, 
more research in the field is needed to determine the actual strength of the phenomenon and 
the factors contributing to its origins. 
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to give an introduction to this thesis and to offer an overview of 
the key aspects of the thesis, its research questions and its findings. First, the motivation for 
the thesis and its background are discussed to bring context to the analytical questions of the 
thesis. Second, the objectives and methodology of the thesis are outlined to illustrate the 
methods of empirical analysis utilized in deriving the empirical findings of the thesis, and to 
show how the thesis is related to the relevant bodies of academic literature. Third, the 
empirical research findings, and the main contributions of the thesis summarized. Fourth, and 
finally, the structure of the rest of the thesis is outlined for guidance. 
1.1 Background and motivation 
The importance of word of mouth generated advice in shaping human decisions has been 
recognized throughout time, but formal analysis of the widely observed phenomenon of word 
of mouth has been few and far between. As noted in the work by evolutionary biologists, such 
as Hoppitt & Laland (2012), the integral propensity of learning from the behavior of others 
has been in advantageous in the development of the human species, and still today remains as 
an influential force in guiding human decision making. The role of traditional advice, whether 
actively sought or passively received, has always been recognized as influential, but the actual 
effects of this kind of word of mouth have traditionally been seen as vaguely defined and, 
little work has been done in terms of academic literature on attempting to quantify the market 
wide effects of word of mouth advice. 
The theoretical base of word of mouth advice as an influence is firmly rooted in theories of 
social learning developed though the course of the last two decades. The recent advances in 
social learning theories have provided new context to word of mouth and its role as a tool for 
aggregating information. Herding models, such as those of Banerjee (1992) and 
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer & Welch (1992), started a stream of literature that has brought 
forward dozens of models for social learning illustrating the different possibilities for word of 
mouth to facilitate information aggregation and asymptotic learning, i.e. convergence of the 
learning outcomes. Especially the pioneering works of Ellison & Fudenberg (1995) & 
Banerjee & Fudenberg (2004) has been instrumental in broadening our understanding of how 
word of mouth can facilitate social learning. 
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The theoretical models of social learning have also been tested a laboratory environment and 
mainly supportive evidence in their favor has been found. While some studies such as 
Anderson & Holt (1997) have found validating support for the theoretical social learning 
models such as that of Bikhchandani et al. (1992), there has also been additional evidence on 
the power of advice facilitated social learning been brought forward by recent experimental 
studies such as Çelen, Kariv & Schotter (2010). Based on their experiment on word of mouth 
advice facilitated social learning Çelen et al. found that advice to be beneficial for the subjects 
payoff, not only for the subject receiving advice, but also for the subject forced to advice.  
The importance of social ties in the transmission of word of mouth advice has for long been 
recognized as in important piece of the puzzle and the conventional wisdom on the matter has 
been that closer social ties lead to more influential advice. This view though has come under 
critique due to recent research findings. In their study on the factors influencing college 
course choices Steffes & Burgee (2009) find impersonal and anonymous advice received via 
an online platform to be more influential in guiding decision making than peer advice from a 
well-known source with a closer social tie, contradicting the conventional view on the matter. 
While on a theoretical level word of mouth advice has been successfully incorporated to the 
numerous theoretical models for social learning and the effects of advice on learning 
outcomes have been tested in laboratory experiments, apart from some few recent 
contributions such as Chevalier & Mayzlin (2006) and Duan, Gu & Whinston (2008), there 
has not been much empirical analysis of its implications on real world product markets 
brought forward. The scarcity of empirical research on the determinants of the effectiveness 
of word of mouth both on an individual level as well as at a market level urges more research 
to be done in the field to deepen our knowledge on the effects of word of mouth on the market 
behavior of economic agents. 
1.2 Objectives and methodology 
The objectives of this thesis are to deepen our understanding on how advice and word of 
mouth are treated in the context of a product purchase decision and how they affect the 
market outcomes through consumer behavior. The thesis aims to provide answers to such 
questions as where does the most valuable word of mouth advice come from in terms of 
sources and channels of transmission, and is actively sought word of mouth different from 
passively received in terms of effectiveness? Additionally, the thesis aims to discover how 
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word of mouth advice affects the relative market shares of smartphone operation systems, and 
whether word of mouth advice can plausibly create significant herd behavior in a product 
market context. 
The methodology of this thesis is to establish a theoretical framework for studying the effects 
of word of mouth via an extensive literature review of previous theoretical and empirical 
literature, and to utilize empirical analysis in this framework to estimate the effects of word of 
mouth, both at an individual consumer level as well as at a market level. In the empirical part 
of the thesis the effectiveness of word of mouth at the individual consumer level is examined 
with the help of a Heckman selection model first presented by Heckman (1979). In the panel 
data estimations of the empirical part of the thesis the ordinary least squares method, the fixed 
effects method as well as the random effects method are used to estimate the effects of word 
of mouth on operation system market shares in the smartphone market. 
1.3 Findings and contribution 
As the areas of interest in the empirical part of this thesis are divided between the individual 
level and market level effects of word of mouth, so can the findings of thesis can be divided 
between the two. In terms of sources for word of mouth advice, this thesis finds the ratings 
given for advice received to be highly correlated with the strength of the social tie between 
the advisor and the receiver of advice. This result reached when differentiating between the 
sources of word of mouth is supported by the estimation results for transmission channel 
effects. Both actively seeking advice and being a technological forerunner are also found to 
have a favorable effect on the probability giving high ratings for advice received on the 
purchase of a high technology device in the form of a smartphone. Interestingly, consumers 
living developed countries also had a considerably higher probability to rate advice highly 
compared to consumers living in developing countries, likely reflecting cultural differences 
and the of inherent product quality effects. 
In terms of market wide effects of word of mouth, the results of the empirical analysis of this 
thesis implicate word of mouth to be strongly correlated with market shares and positive word 
of mouth having a positive effect on operations system market shares in many of the 
smartphone markets analyzed. These results are however far from conclusive as there is large 
variation in estimation results between different operation systems and markets analyzed. 
Additional limitations to the generalizability of these results are also brought by data 
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limitations hindering the exact identification of forces affecting product market shares in the 
smartphone operation system market. As the market is highly dynamic and in constant rapid 
development, there is a significant possibility for individual product specific time variant 
effects hindering the econometric identification of causality between word of mouth and 
market shares. 
The contribution of this thesis to the body of knowledge on social learning and word of mouth 
is to identify some of the factors related to the effectiveness of word of mouth from an 
individual agent’s perspective and to attempt to quantify the market dynamic effects of 
positive word of mouth in a real world product market setting. As neither of these subjects has 
been previously extensively researched from an economics perspective, the purpose of this 
thesis is to broaden our knowledge of these subjects and phenomenon, and to hopefully in its 
part help to facilitate further future research in the field. 
1.4 Structure of the thesis  
The structure of the rest of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 outlines an overview of social 
learning and the different economic theories and models used to model it. Chapter 3 will 
discuss the important earlier research on social learning and word of mouth. Chapter 4 gives a 
description of the smartphone market and describes the sources of data used in the empirical 
analysis sections of the thesis. Chapter 5 lays out the key empirical research questions of the 
thesis and describes the empirical framework and econometric models used for empirical 
analysis. Chapter 6 presents the empirical results of the thesis. Chapter 7 concludes by 
discussing the findings of the thesis, its main limitations and its key implications for future 
research. 
2. Theories of social learning 
Imitation and conformation to social norms have always been an integral part of human 
behavior. As already put into words by Machiavelli (1988) in the early sixteenth century, “For 
men almost always follow in the footsteps of others, imitation being a leading principle of 
human behavior.” (p. 19) This tendency inherent in all of us to conforming to norms and 
imitating others is also not limited only to human beings. For example Morgan, Rendell, Ehn, 
Hoppitt & Laland (2012) among others argue that the bases of human social learning are 
deeply rooted in our evolutionary development as a species. Galef & Laland (2005) have 
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brought forward empirical evidence and theoretical models concerning social learning among 
animals. Learning from others has thus always been an invaluable tool for various species for 
acquiring and aggregating information. Aggregation of information among group members 
has traditionally been seen as an efficient way to make the most out of the scarce 
observational and cognitive resources possessed by individuals. 
The exact definition for social learning varies between scholars, but it can be broadly defined 
as studying how agents learn by observing the behavior of others in an asymmetric 
information environment, and how the aggregation of information among agents affects the 
equilibrium outcome. While not always defined as such, the concept of social learning has 
nevertheless been around for centuries now. Indeed, according to Chamley (2003) the earliest 
formal analysis of information aggregation and the efficiency of group behavior date back to 
the 18
th
 century and the pioneering work on jury behavior and election design by Marie Jean 
Antoine Nicolas de Caritat, marquis de Condorcet. De Caritat (1785) presented the first 
formal illustration of analysis and modeling of the information aggregation process focal in 
all social learning theory, and modern research on the subject owes much to the much to its 
methodology. 
As economies and societies fundamentally consist of individual agents, economic and social 
outcomes are essentially a product of the decisions made by these agents under varying 
degrees of social interaction. It is therefore important to consider the effects of the 
information aggregation process between the agents to learning outcomes and their efficiency. 
Although the methods of social learning have undoubtedly benefitted the evolution of various 
species, humans in particular, the equilibrium outcomes produced by social learning are 
however not always strictly efficient or desirable. 
In recent decades, a wide variety of models for social learning have been introduced by a 
number of different economists. Each of these models typically studies a certain aspect of 
social learning under some distinct behavioral- and institutional assumptions that strongly 
affect agent behavior, the information aggregation process and the equilibrium outcome. 
Although the concept of social learning is common to many social sciences, it can be seen as 
a vital part in determining the behavior of economic agents, and therefore as an integral 
component of all economic theory. Most theories for social learning in economics are usually 
set in a microeconomic environment and describe the behavior of agents in a microeconomic 
setting. The implications of the theories are however not limited to microeconomics only, as 
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they can play a significant part in describing agent behavior and the information aggregation 
process in the current micro founded models popular in contemporary macroeconomics. 
In economics the focal point of social learning theories has been on the process of information 
aggregation and how it contributes to the possibility of asymptotic learning outcomes. 
Asymptotic learning implies that the social learning system will converge to an asymptotic 
equilibrium with all agents choosing one and the same action or alternative. The possibility 
for asymptotic learning is important as it can have large implications on efficiency and 
welfare. If the system experiences asymptotic learning and eventually converges to an 
asymptotic equilibrium, the equilibrium might or might not be an efficient one. This can, at 
least in theory, result in the system converging to an inefficient equilibrium, such as an 
inferior technology being adopted over the societally more efficient one. Asymptotic learning 
is also a key aspect in economic theories explaining observable phenomenon such as herd 
behavior, a subject which I turn to next. 
2.1 Herd behavior 
Herd behavior is a well-known and an often observed phenomenon where agents decide to 
choose the same alternative from a set of multiple available alternatives, in other words herd 
towards one of the options. As the name suggests, the term herd behavior pertains to the 
tendency of animals to gather together into flocks and herds. In human behavior, herding is 
also commonly observed. Herd behavior has so far been already used to explain various 
observable events such as how peaceful street demonstrations can sometimes turn into violent 
riots, the spreading of fashion trends and why irrational financial bubbles are frequently 
observed, as noted by Bikhchandani et al. (1992) among others. Although herd behavior is 
such a commonly observed phenomenon in real life, no definitive explanation for this 
observed tendency has yet been given. Many possible explanations have been voiced in 
literature by various economists, but no point of view can be seen as completely dominating 
others. In fact, it is a generally held belief that the reasons for herding vary from one situation 
to another, and that there are usually multiple factors simultaneously affecting the outcome. 
2.1.1 Informational cascades 
From a social learning perspective the contributions of economics to the body of knowledge 
on the reasons and implications of herd behavior and its related concepts are usually seen to 
 11 
 
have begun with the nearly simultaneously published seminal works by Banerjee (1992) and 
Bikhchandani et. Al. (1992). The two papers are widely seen as having given birth to the 
whole field of modern economic analysis of social learning and they form the foundation on 
which almost all subsequent work in the economics of social learning has been built upon. 
Both studies utilize somewhat similar models to study the effects of information aggregation 
on asymptotic learning and herd behavior. The key drivers behind herding suggested by both 
studies are informational cascades. Formally informational cascades are defined by 
Bikhchandani et al. (1992) as, “An informational cascade occurs when it is optimal for an 
individual, having observed the actions of those ahead of him, to follow the behavior of the 
preceding individual without regard to his own information.” (p.992) 
The idea behind the informational cascades theory is roughly speaking that, in a social 
learning setting where each agent possesses at least some amount of private information, it is 
rational for decision makers to consider the behavior of other agents before making one’s own 
decision The reason for this being that the decisions of others should at least in theory reflect 
their private information that other agents are not privy to. Including the publicly available 
information into the decision problem will on the other hand reduce the information value of 
each agent’s private information that the other agents receive via observing their decisions. 
This of course steers the agents to utilize more of the public information, and hence become 
less responsive to their own private information, further reducing its informational value. 
The likely result of this all as argued by Bikhchandi et al. (1992) is that, because all of the 
agents are trying to benefit from the private information of other agents, everyone will end up 
choosing the same choice as all the other agents, even in a situation where their own private 
information would advise them to do otherwise. The agents thus choose to ignore their own 
private information in favor information received from other agents creating an informational 
cascade. The natural implication of such a cascade is asymptotic learning and herding towards 
one of the possible choices. The subject of which types of circumstances are required for 
informational cascades to appear and cause significant herding among agents is an actively 
discussed topic among researchers. Asymptotic learning outcomes described in social 
learning literature have been very sensitive to model construction and to different model 
specific parameters. It also needs to be remembered that that, while the presence of an 
informational cascade implies herding to result, herd behavior is not necessarily the caused by 
the presence of a cascade. 
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2.1.2 Externalities 
Apart from informational cascades just discussed, other reasons for herding voiced in 
literature have range from internal needs for conformity and the punishment of deviants to 
positive payoff externalities and network effects. A general unifying theme to the non-social 
learning explanations for herd behavior is that, while social learning models center on 
studying the effects of purely informational externalities on the equilibrium outcome, the 
other avenues of research usually include payoff related externalities as well as other type of 
externalities for agents’ actions to be included in the decision rules applied by agents. 
Perhaps the most famous argument in economics literature for attributing herd behavior to be 
driven by other factors besides informational externalities is given by Becker (1991), who 
introduces a demand externality model for consumer demand for restaurants. In the model, an 
individual’s demand for the product of restaurant services is positively dependent on the 
aggregate demand for the product. As one can immediately suspect, the model produces 
strong herding behavior, as a small amount of initial demand for one of the products will 
strengthen the future demand of that product. In the long run Becker’s model ultimately 
converges to an asymptotic equilibrium, with all consumers choosing the same restaurant. For 
illustrations of payoff externalities driven herding one can also consider the obvious benefits 
of all drivers heading in the same direction driving on the same side of the road and the 
positive network effects related to e.g. the diffusion of telephones or the internet, which hard 
to question. 
It is of course at least in theory also possible for herd behavior to arise from the fact that 
similar agents facing a similar choice situation are bound to make similar choices. For 
example, if there is one product in a market that is distinctly superior to all the other products, 
it would only be natural that all agents would then decide to purchase that superior product. 
Nonetheless, it is more than plausible to assume at least some degree of variation between the 
agents’ preferences and hence their private information: This in turn implies that there is at 
least some degree of information- or payoff related externalities being at play in the presence 
of considerable herding of behavior. 
Multiple factors including payoff externalities can be seen as having considerable explanatory 
power in explaining herd behavior in various types of real world settings. Nevertheless, from 
the viewpoint of social learning literature they are not seen as relevant as informational 
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cascades in the settings of interest to social learning theories. As the focus of this thesis is on 
social learning, and more specifically word of mouth facilitated social learning, the rest of this 
thesis the focus will mainly be on models with purely informational externalities and the other 
aspects affecting learning outcomes are only discussed when needed. 
2.1.3 Communication in learning 
The majority of social learning models in economics focus on a learning structure where 
agents gather information only by observing the actions or choices of other agents and there is 
no direct communication between them. An essential line of research has however also 
developed models where information aggregation is facilitated by agents communicating with 
each other and receiving advice via word of mouth communication. Even though there is a 
commonly held general belief that actions speak louder than words, in a social learning 
setting the two forms of information transmission can in most cases considered to be 
comparable. In addition, recent experimental evidence to support the notion that in some 
cases advice and word of mouth can be even more influential in affecting decisions than 
observing actions as demonstrated e.g. by Çelen, Kariv & Schotter (2010). 
The relative importance of actions vs. words in aggregating private information in all 
probability depends on the theoretical and experimental setting, which will be discussed more 
in depth later on when some of the experimental evidence on the matter is reviewed. For now 
I simply follow the approach of Chamley (2003), who noted, “When agents learn from 
actions, these actions are the “words” for communication.” (p. 4). Based on this, in the 
context of this thesis, the information value and effectiveness in facilitating learning can with 
fair degree of generalizability be seen roughly equal, if not noted otherwise. This justifies 
comparison between different models of social learning that feature either actions or words 
for information transmission in their learning mechanism. While the body of literature dealing 
with social learning is rather extensive, the variety utilizing specifically word of mouth 
communication in a social learning mechanism is alas still rather narrow. This in turn further 
stresses the importance of comparability of models with other forms of observable behavior 
such as actions discussed above. 
The first work to explicitly introduce word of mouth communication to the social learning 
theory literature was the seminal contribution of Ellison & Fudenberg (1995), who consider a 
simple model of competing products with naïve and boundedly rational agents utilizing a 
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myopic decision rule and information transmitted through word of mouth communication in 
determining their choices. They find that, while certainly being a plausible outcome under 
some light premises such as limited sample sizes, the realization of asymptotic learning 
depends closely on the structure of the word of mouth communication process. In addition, 
their findings also implicate that a smaller amount of communication, or a smaller sample size 
in the context of their model, makes conformity and thus herding more likely. 
An alternative view on social learning via word of mouth is taken by Banerjee & Fudenberg 
(2004), who in turn examine a model of word of mouth learning incorporating rational agents 
sampling N other agents under a Bayesian learning mechanism to establish the convergence 
properties of such a system. The conclusions of Banerjee & Fudenberg are somewhat similar 
to the conclusions of Ellison & Fudenberg (1995) in the sense that they find that, under 
suitable assumptions such as proportional sampling, there is a strong possibility for 
asymptotic learning to result. In contrast however, their results implicate that large samples of 
agents from which agents receive communication are more favorable to herding than small 
samples. 
The disparity between the results of the two studies highlights the enormous sensitivity of 
learning outcomes in social learning models to the structure of the model and its underlying 
assumptions. Just as most theories and models produced on the subject differ in their 
assumptions on the structure of the world, they also differ in their findings under these 
assumptions. In following sections I go through some of most vital assumptions and modeling 
choices applied in relevant social learning literature regarding sampling rules used by agents 
and the structure of communication in order to draw conclusions on their implications on any 
possible asymptotic learning outcomes. 
2.2 Learning mechanisms 
The models presented by Ellison & Fudenberg (1995) and Banerjee & Fudenberg (2004) can 
be classified as representing the two different main branches of social learning research in 
respect to the learning mechanism they incorporate. The former features boundedly rational 
agents utilizing a myopic decision making rule, while the latter assumes rational agents able 
to make use of Bayesian learning abilities in their decision making. The above distinction is 
not definitive in the sense that some social learning models combine both Bayesian and 
myopic elements, and that there are several other important model characteristics that can be 
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used to classify social learning models. This particular type of classification into rational and 
non-rational models is however undoubtedly useful, as the learning methods applied by 
agents usually have repeating effects on outcomes through other model specifications and 
partially determine other influential factors such as e.g. the sampling rules used by agents and 
the structure of the communication process among others.  
2.2.1 Bayesian learning 
A large proportion of the models suggested in relevant social learning literature, the seminal 
works of Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani et al. (1992) among others, feature some form of 
a rational Bayesian learning mechanism to facilitate learning. The term Bayesian learning 
refers to an environment where agents act according to a decision rule where they incorporate 
Bayesian inference and Bayes’ rule to constantly and rationally update their beliefs when new 
information becomes available. Formally Bayes’ rule can be is defined as: 
  ( | )  
 ( | )  ( )
 ( )
, (2.1) 
where  ( | ) represents the posterior probability assigned to A after B has been observed, 
 ( | ) represents the likelihood, or in other words the probability, of observing B after 
observing A and  ( ) and  ( ) respectively represent the independent prior probabilities of 
observing A or B. In Bayesian inference, the posterior probability for A determines the 
probability assigned by an agent to the state of the world A occurring after having observed 
the relevant set of data in the form of observing B. All this simply means that agents 
constantly update their assessments of the probabilities for different states of the world, 
probabilities derived via Bayes’ rule, and, as soon as new information becomes available, 
agents immediately incorporate it to their assessments on which they base their decisions. 
The decision rules utilized in the models of Bayesian social learning vary, but they generally 
tend to follow the same pattern of agents first rationally forming beliefs and then choosing the 
optimal choice from some group of alternatives according to a decision rule determined by 
model construction. As discussed more in depth below, many researchers that have opted to 
model social learning with boundedly rational agents take the Bayesian world as their point of 
departure and introduce bounds on agent behavior based on their modeling needs. The most 
common restrictions on agent rationality include e.g. myopia in the sense that agents only 
maximize their current utility and not their lifetime utility and restricting agents’ to forming 
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beliefs only on the behavior of the subset of other agents who they can observe and not the 
entire population. The exact decision rules that agents are assumed to utilize nevertheless vary 
between models and are usually determined jointly with other key model characteristics such 
as the sampling rule used to determine the observations of agents and the structure of 
communication and information transmission. 
2.2.2 Myopic learning 
The other important class of learning mechanisms in social of research, apart from the 
Bayesian models is boundedly rational models that restrains from the heavy assumptions of 
Bayesian rationality and rely on agents having simpler naïve learning rules guiding their 
actions. The question of how rational can economic agents assumed to be is of course a 
difficult question and a question that’s definitive answer is outside the main scope of this 
thesis. Nonetheless, considering the world we live in and the decision environments of real 
word economic agents, the boundedly rational models of social learning certainly seem as 
plausible proposals in many instances. In the real world it is usually plausible to presume at 
least some degree of boundedness in the rationality of agents, if nothing else stemming from 
our bounded cognitive abilities. No conclusion on whether or not assuming bounds on 
rationality is the right approach for modeling agent behavior in social learning models has yet 
been reached, and at the moment both Bayesian and myopic models can be validly seen as 
relevant predictors of agent behavior, depending on the situation. 
While there exists a wide array of different myopic decision rules applied to social learning 
context the seminal illustration of a boundedly rational decision rule in social learning 
literature is given by Ellison & Fudenberg (1993), who present two models for technology 
adaption with boundedly rational agents. For example, the first of their two models 
incorporates homogenous agents utilizing a naïve and myopic rule of thumb decision rule that 
ignores all historical data and considers only the optimal choice of the previous period when 
making the decision on which of the two possible technologies to adopt. The evolution of the 
system at issue is then described by:  
  (    |  )  (   )     , (2.2) 
Where    and      represent the fraction of the population using technology A in periods t 
and t+1 respectively. Naturally, the fractions using technology B are then respectively given 
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by (1-   ) and (1-     ). α represents the fraction of the population chosen randomly that are 
allowed to revise their choices at each period and p is simply the probability that using 
technology A gives agents a higher payoff than using technology B. 
The naïve decision rule of agents in Ellison & Fudenberg (1993) outlined above states that all 
agents allowed to revise their choice of technology choose the technology that had the higher 
payoff in the preceding period after observing the average payoffs of the two choices in the 
previous period. As the population is homogenous, the users of each technology receive the 
same payoff as all others using that technology. The payoff parameter p describing the 
relative payoffs of the two technologies is defined by a stochastic process consisting of the 
sum of a constant, but unknown, parameter θ and an independently and identically distributed 
shock parameter     with a zero mean. The role of the shock parameter     is to bring variance 
to the relative payoffs of the two technologies. Depending on the intrinsic payoffs of the 
technologies the effects of the changes in     may or may not be enough to affect the ordering 
of the payoffs. 
A notable feature of Ellison & Fudenberg (1993) that separates their models from some of the 
other similar models brought forward is that periodically some of the agents are allowed to re-
assess their decision between the technologies and are not constrained to making a once and 
for all decision. This is one of the main drivers in their results as demonstrated by their first 
proposed model described above in which the speed of technology adoption is correlated with 
the level of the payoff difference between the two technologies, which in turn is determined 
by their intrinsic quality and an exogenously determined technological shock parameter. 
Although the welfare implications of social learning models are examined more thoroughly in 
a subsequent section, I note that according to Ellison & Fudenberg (1993) the practical 
implication of their simple model discussed above is that technologies that have a small 
probability of resulting in a big payoff improvement and a large probability in resulting in a 
small loss will in all likeliness be adopted relatively slowly. If true, this can have substantial 
effects on a societal level as e.g. vaccines and seatbelts can be classified as technologies 
possessing such traits. 
In conclusion, both the models based on Bayesian learning and the “rule of thumb” models 
featuring non-Bayesian learning have their place in social learning literature. The relative 
abundance of Bayesian models compared to the more myopic models is most likely a signal 
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of most researchers seeing the world of fully rational agents as their starting point in 
modeling, and depending on their perspective and the exact target of research introduce 
bounds on agents’ rationality when required. Although the structure of learning is one of the 
most vital elements in modeling social learning, the equilibrium outcomes are generally a sum 
of numerous factors. An important determinant of model specification closely related to 
agents’ learning mechanisms is the sampling rule that is used in forming the samples that 
agent’s observe. The observed samples are one of the main inputs of the learning mechanisms 
and decision rules described above and hence warrant a closer look in the next section. 
2.3 Sampling rules 
In tight relation to learning mechanisms in determining the attributes of social learning are the 
sampling rules agent’s use to form their beliefs. These sampling rules can be in regard to 
observing the actions of other agents, their payoffs or receiving information in another form 
such as advice or word of mouth. In addition to the structure of the learning mechanism itself, 
the choice of sampling rule is one of the most important determinants of social learning 
models and is usually considered to be the key determinant of system behavior and 
convergence. Sampling rules determining what agents observe are related to both the form of 
information they receive, in other words whether they observe actions or receive 
communication etc., and the amount and variety of information agents receive in terms of the 
size of the group of agents they sample  
The sampling rules incorporated into social learning models range from the simple 
proportional sampling rules, such as observing the behavior of all agents, to more selective 
sampling rules constraining observations to a small group of agents or even to a single agent. 
Broadly speaking, in relation to the chosen sampling rule, social learning models can be 
divided into two different categories. In the first category there are models with proportional 
sampling and samples give an accurate picture of the whole population. In the other category 
there are models that use un-proportional or biased sampling and hence oversample a certain 
group of individuals. This second category of models with oversampling can be further 
divided into models where decision makers observe only the behavior of single other decision 
maker, to models where they observe the behavior of a small group of individuals determined 
by a specific observational rule such as their neighborhood or the existence of a group of 
extensively influential group of individuals and to models where all the behavior of all agents 
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is observed but an un-proportionally large part of the sample is formed by observations of the 
behavior or the prominent group. 
2.3.1 Proportional sampling 
The most common proportional sampling rules applied are either letting agents observe all 
previous actions, such as in Bikhchandani et al (1992), or independently drawing the 
observations from a probability distribution, such as in Banerjee & Fudenberg (2004), or 
letting agents observe a sufficient random sample of the population as in Ellison & Fudenberg 
(1995). When many of the early contributions to social learning theory, such as Bikhchandani 
et al. and Ellison & Fudenberg brought forward models with proportional sampling, the 
current focus of the field has evidently shifted towards models with non-proportional 
sampling and their implications. Proportional sampling models have however remained 
relevant, and other notable examples of models featuring proportional sampling are given by 
Vives (1997), Smith & Sørensen (2000). Each of these models differs on their characteristics 
and also on the proportional sampling rule applied.  
The exact definition for what is meant with proportional sampling has as of yet not been 
uniformly defined and definitions used vary between scholars. It can mean either agents 
observing all behavior preceding their decision point or just a sufficiently representative 
sample of that behavior. In the context of this thesis I consider, both samples containing 
observations of all previous behavior as well as all samples that authors have labeled as 
proportional to be adequately representative of the underlying population and qualify as 
proportional sampling. Even if easy to model and intuitively straightforward, proportional 
sampling rules can sometimes lack in some of the modeling flexibility that the un-
proportional sampling rules considered next possess. 
2.3.2 Oversampling 
Given that the modeling properties and requirements of proportional sampling might be less 
cumbersome than biased sampling, there can nevertheless be benefits in applying an 
insightful un-proportional sampling rule. Considering models with oversampling of some 
proportion of population allows the researcher to focus on the effects of a smaller group of 
individuals on the outcome of the model and is in most cases also an empirically more 
plausible solution. After all, we as humans are usually bounded in our samples to observing 
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the behavior of those individuals that it is actually possible for us to observe, rather than 
receiving accurate information on the behavior of the whole relevant population. In terms of 
the frequency of sampling utilized in models, sampling usually goes hand in hand with 
decision points in the sense that social learning is facilitated with allowing agents some form 
of information sampling before requiring them to make a decision. 
A special class of oversampling models is formed by maybe the simplest form of 
oversampling in which agents observing only the behavior of a single agent, their immediate 
predecessor and is considered by e.g. Banerjee (1992) and Çelen & kariv (2004a). This class 
of models is related to other theories of Bayes rational sequential decision making and the 
unique feature of restraining the sample to include only a single observation diminishes the 
information set available to decision makers compared to larger samples. Furthermore, Çelen 
& Kariv note that, as the amount of information available to decision maker increases with the 
number of observations in his sample, an agent immediately succeeding a deviator in 
sequential decision making is less likely to follow the deviator as his sample size grows. The 
results of Çelen & Kariv are supported by similar results reached by Banerjee & Fudenberg 
(2004), who proceed to argue that larger samples are more favorable to system convergence 
and hence asymptotic learning as they contain more information and rule out the possibilities 
of receiving very extreme samples as in the case of sampling only one individual. 
Models allowing agents to observe only the behavior of their predecessor are an important 
part of the theory of social learning and are used in modeling decision making e.g. in some 
voting situations where decision are announced sequentially. The part of social learning 
literature using oversampling that is most relevant to word of mouth facilitated social learning 
literature has nevertheless concentrated on oversampling a small but nonsingular group of 
individuals. This sort of a small group that is observed by all agents in their sample has been 
descriptively described by Bala & Goyal (1998) as the model possessing a royal family. The 
natural extension of this in the context of word of mouth learning is to consider such a group 
of influential individuals to be some sort of opinion leaders whose behavior and decisions are 
observed by all agents for some reason or another. 
Additional models further considering different forms of oversampling of a certain group of 
agents include Ellison & Fudenberg (1993) in a boundedly rational environt and Banerjee & 
Fudenberg (2004) in a Bayesian environment. They both reach similar conclusions in terms of 
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sufficiently structured oversampling including popularity weighing or extreme payoffs can 
assist in facilitating asymptotic learning.  
Building on their basic model of word of mouth facilitated social learning with proportional 
sampling, Banerjee & Fudenberg (2004) also consider alternative sampling rules of agents 
experiencing perception biases or reporting biases affecting their samples. Their results 
indicate that that oversampling of the more efficient choice may lead to the system to be more 
likely to converge towards it. This result driven by biased sampling rules is important when 
considering the fact that, as noted by Anderson (1998) among others, word of mouth 
communication is produced relatively more by individuals who have received extreme 
payoffs, positive- or negative-, than by individuals who have received payoffs close to 
average. The joint implication then is that word of mouth communication by agents is likely 
to drive the system to converge to one of the extremes via facilitating asymptotic learning. 
2.3.3 Social networks 
An assumption often made in social learning literature is that the signals received from agents 
via sampling are of uniform value to the decision maker. In the context of word of mouth 
communication, a more empirically plausible approach would be to consider signals coming 
from different agents not to be of equal value as in reality people tend to value more the 
opinion of e.g. the so called experts or in many instances of people to whom we relate to more 
closely than others. One way of incorporating such properties is to consider the implications 
of modeling learning through an explicitly mapped social network connecting the agents, 
rather than e.g. drawing observation samples from a random distribution. Especially in recent 
years have models utilizing social network mapping been gaining momentum in studying 
social learning.  
This is not surprising as the recent advantages in computer technology has allowed us to 
utilize ever more computational power in making calculations, which of course can be very 
advantageous in mapping social networks and computing outcomes. Network modeling has 
been utilized in both models with Bayesian and non-Bayesian learning mechanisms. The 
benefits of considering explicit social networks in learning can be quite distinct in terms of 
understanding between agent communication and its effects. One of the major advantages 
network modeling is that it allows us to consider the different types of signals agents receive 
through communication. 
 22 
 
In reality, there are numerous factors influencing how an agent perceives the signal he/she 
receives. For example some of the major factors affecting signal strength, quality and 
effectiveness relate to the distance between the two agents communicating as well as the 
identity of the communicators and the strength of their social tie. Assuming all word of mouth 
to be equal can be advantageous from a modeling perspective, as it can greatly simplify the 
model and reduce some of the computational burden it might include. Nonetheless, from an 
empirical perspective, assuming equal signals across agents can be seen as a somewhat naïve 
assumption and a possible bias producing factor when the real world performance of the 
model is considered. A closer look on the empirical and experimental evidence gathered on 
social learning models will be taken in the next chapter. 
One of the most prominent examples of a Bayesian model of network facilitated social 
learning has been brought forward by Acemoglu, Dahleh, Lobel, & Ozdaglar (2011), who 
examine a Bayesian equilibrium in a sequential learning model utilizing a general form of a 
social network. Their work can be partly seen as extending the seminal work of Banerjee 
(1992) and Bikhchandani et al. (1992) to cover more general social networks. Whereas 
Banerjee (1992) assumes individuals only observe the behavior of the individual immediately 
preceding them and Bikhchandani et al. assume individuals to observe the full history of play, 
i.e. all previous actions of each decision maker, Acemoglu et al. postulate that agents to 
observe the past actions of a stochastically-generated neighborhood of individuals. Depending 
on some of the additional assumptions made on the private beliefs held by individuals and the 
possible oversampling of some group of agents, the main findings of Acemoglu et al. indicate 
a strong probability for an asymptotic learning outcome in the stochastic networks described 
by their model. 
Among the main findings of Acemoglu et al. (2011) is also the fact that, while the presence of 
a royal family, or an excessively influential group of individuals, can significantly hinder and 
slow down asymptotic learning, it cannot prevent it completely. According to Acemoglu et al. 
this result is bound to hold as long as private beliefs are bounded in the sense that there is a 
bound for the amount of information in a private information signal, and the group of 
influential individuals does not constitute the full set of observations sampled by the other 
agents. Another example of a network learning model in a Bayesian rational setting is given 
by Gale & Kariv (2003), who examine a social network where agents can only observe the 
actions of the other agents that they are connected to via the network. They find that over time 
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the initial diversity in the network driven by diverged private information is eventually 
replaced by conformity in actions, if not in beliefs, hence giving support to the findings of 
Acemoglu et al. 
In the setting of boundedly rational social learning models with social networks, some of the 
important models suggested include Bala & Goyal (1998), DeMarzo, Vayanos & Zwiebel 
(2003) and Golub & Jackson (2007). The model of Bala & Goyal focuses on examining a 
connected society where agents are considered to be neighbors when they have access each 
other’s’ complete histories of actions and outcomes, and vice versa. In the model of Bala & 
Goyal this structure leads to their most important finding of payoff equality between 
neighbors. The result is driven by idea that all agents making a decision need to receive at 
least the same payoff as their predecessor did, as they can always copy the choice of their 
predecessor. In the long run this means that all agents will obtain the same payoffs and, if 
different choices have different payoffs, all agents will in the long run converge to making the 
same choice. This payoff equality result has also garnered support in the studies of Gale & 
Kariv (2003) and Acemoglu et al. (2011) in the Bayesian rational modeling framework. 
One of the key attributes separating studies on social learning in networks is their findings on 
the so called “royal family” effect first introduced by Bala & Goayal (1998). In many of the 
models utilizing a boundedly rational learning mechanism, e.g. Bala & Goyal and Golub & 
Jackson (2007) to name a few, the existence of a prominent influential group of agents 
observed by all tends to prevent sufficient information aggregation to facilitate asymptotic 
learning. In contrast to this, the results of the Bayesian model of Acemoglu et al. (2011) are 
that, in the Bayesian framework agents constantly update their beliefs and also form beliefs 
on the unobserved agents in the population. This means that the presence of a prominent 
group does not prevent asymptotic learning as long as the said group does not form the entire 
sample of observations for all individuals. The effects of prominent groups can be very 
important for studying the effects of word of mouth communication. It is more than plausible 
to assume at least some sort of a prominent group of individuals consisting of so the called 
experts having a greater influence on opinion formation than other network members due to 
the better quality of their advice or their greater visibility. 
One of the big challenges in modeling social learning in social networks is related to the 
stochastic nature of social networks, as they hardly ever remain stable through time. The 
formation of social networks is in part driven by individuals themselves, and it is highly 
 24 
 
plausible that an individual receiving a bad payoff from acting on the information received 
from his/her current social network takes action to alter his/her network in order to receive 
more useful signals in the future. This of course produces a challenge to all static models of 
social networks. That being said, modeling always requires some sort of simplification when 
compared to real life. Perhaps future models utilizing ever more the possibilities opened by 
computer aided network mappings and computational power can give us more insight on the 
matter. 
2.4 Efficiency and welfare 
After reviewing some of the key features and determinants of the theoretical models on social 
learning, it is time to take a look at their welfare implications in a broader context. The 
modeling properties discussed above are important, but they are not the sole determinants of 
social learning model outcomes and behavior. It is therefore now time to take a look at some 
of the most important properties of social learning model equilibriums in terms of efficiency- 
and welfare implications. As the main focus of social learning models has tended to be on 
identifying the possible drivers for asymptotic learning and herd behavior, I start by briefly 
discussing some of the results that reached on the convergence and stability properties of 
asymptotic learning, after which the focus is turned towards examining the welfare 
implications of social learning models and asymptotic learning equilibriums. 
2.4.1 Efficiency of asymptotic learning 
The efficiency of social learning outcomes is of course a key interest when it comes to social 
learning models. Because such a wide variety of different social learning models each with 
their assumptions and characteristics have been suggested, as of yet, there are not that many 
universal conclusions and implications to be drawn as  no single model can be seen to have 
risen above others in terms of its explanatory power and behavior describing abilities. There 
are however some general key points across the different models to be discussed. As with 
social learning models in general, these findings are usually very model specific and 
parameter sensitive and great care needs to be taken when making broader conclusions based 
on them. 
The convergence of social learning models to an asymptotic learning outcome is a natural 
point of interest in social learning models. Generally speaking, most of the social learning 
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models brought forward in literature do converge to an asymptotic equilibrium for at least 
some set and values of parameters. The main points of discussion in the literature have mainly 
been more on the specific model characteristics that produce such an asymptotic learning 
outcome. Considering that the initiating driver for the whole field of social learning literature 
in economics, and indeed the focus of most of the models that belong this body of literature, 
has been on explaining the observable real world outcome of herd behavior in its various 
forms, it is not surprising that researchers have presented models that do in fact result in 
herding. In terms of learning outcomes one can even go as far as generalizing that most 
models discussed in social learning literature converge to a stable equilibrium over time. Only 
in some special cases, such as of a sequential decision models similar to Banerjee (1992) is 
there a credible possibility for multiple opposite informational cascades to arise in such a way 
that the system there is not sufficient convergence in the long term, but the was left 
indeterminably hovering between steady states. 
Additional points of consideration, related to the speed of information aggregation and model 
convergence arising from the literature are the notions of results of Vives (1997) and 
Acemoglu et al. (2011). Vives argues in his paper that the speed of information aggregation in 
a market based social learning model of the type referred to above does not differ from the 
speed of socially optimal convergence. This in turn implicates that any welfare loss resulting 
from herd behavior should be attributed rather to the equilibrium end result of the process 
than to the speed that the convergence it is attained with. Acemoglu et al. on the other hand 
raise the point of the existence of a prominent group of individuals that is observed by others 
to hinder the convergence speed of social learning. In their network model the presence of 
such a group they describe as informational leaders will according to their results seriously 
slow down the speed of convergence of asymptotic learning, but will not be able to prevent it 
in the long run. 
In terms of sampling, proportional sampling and larger sample sizes generally speaking tend 
to be more beneficial for the existence of a social learning equilibrium. As implied by 
Banerjee & Fudenberg (2004), the likelihood for equilibrium to arise is larger with large 
proportional samples than biased sample sizes or the extreme sample size of a single 
observation. This is based on the idea that larger sample sizes and proportional sample sizes 
allow for more information to be transmitted, making it easier for agents to aggregate 
information between them, allowing all agents to discover choice that is most efficient or has 
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the highest payoff. Combined with the results of Vives (1997) this leads to the conclusion that 
larger and more proportional sample sizes are, ceteris paribus, better on a societal level from a 
welfare point of view as well.  
Nevertheless, the above result drawn from the Bayesian world of social learning needs to be 
taken with a grain of salt when extended into the world of myopic learning mechanisms. In 
contrast to the above results Ellison & Fudenberg (1995) share the results of many Bayesian 
models in terms that smaller sample sizes contribute positively to the likelihood of herding. 
That being said, they also continue to argue further that, at least in their myopic model of 
word of mouth facilitated learning, the learning outcomes are most efficient when there is a 
limited amount of communication and information aggregation between the agents. This is a 
good example of variance in the implications of social learning models and their sensitivity to 
the discretion and assumptions of the modelers. 
One more important point regarding the efficiency of social learning discussed Ellison & 
Fudenberg (1993), but not widely observed in literature, is the assumption of a heterogeneous 
population in a technology adoption framework. In the second model introduced in Ellison & 
Fudenberg it is presumed that there are two competing technologies, each optimal to a 
different group of agents, and the question of interest is whether the right technology is 
adopted by the right agents. The important results are that, no amount of popularity weighing 
will lead to an efficient outcome, which is in contrast to the homogenous population models, 
where popularity weighing tends to slow down the rate of convergence, but does not prevent 
it completely. 
The issue of heterogeneous agents is very important, as in reality gents do differ in many 
aspects e.g. in their preferences. Studying a learning environment with truly heterogeneous 
agents would be very insightful for drawing real world implications for social learning 
models, but in turn also be more difficult to model than the usual homogenous agent 
environments. Hopefully we will see this line of research explored more in depth as computer 
assisted models of explicit social network modeling develop further in the future. 
2.4.2 Welfare implications 
Considering that the welfare effects of substantial herd behavior can be considerable, the 
welfare implications of social learning models still need more research for any definitive 
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conclusions to be drawn. Many researchers do touch upon the welfare implications implied by 
their model, but the conclusions to be drawn are usually limited to the acknowledgement of 
the possibility of either a positive or a negative equilibrium, e.g. in the form of adopting an 
inefficient technology, to emerge as a result of information aggregation process. An important 
caveat is the fact that, while herd behavior is usually discussed in the context of having a 
negative effect on welfare, herding and asymptotic convergence as the result of social 
learning in itself says nothing about the efficiency and welfare properties of the solution. At 
least in theory, it is just as possible for herd behavior to produce positive welfare effects on 
individual- and social levels as it can produce negative effects. 
Perhaps the most thorough discussion on the welfare implications of social learning models is 
offered by Vives (1997), who compares the welfare effects produced by market based 
learning to optimal learning in smooth and noisy versions of a statistical prediction model, 
where the smoothness of the model refers to the continuity of payoffs and action spaces. To 
interpret the welfare effects of social learning Vives defines herd behavior as agents deviating 
from socially optimal weighing of private information and public information. The socially 
optimal outcome is then defined as the solution to a team optimization problem, where the 
decision rules of agents minimize the discounted sum of their prediction errors. 
The results of Vives’ (1997) welfare analysis indicate that the socially optimal team solution 
will succeed in accumulating more information and lead to a socially more desirable outcome 
than the market based solution representing a standard Bayesian social learning model for 
information aggregation. Furthermore, Vives argues that, though there will be convergence 
for both the market based- and socially optimal solution, the convergence to an equilibrium 
will be slow and that the welfare loss arising from the under aggregation of information 
present in the market based solution can be quite substantial. 
The main contributor to the inefficiency of the market based solution when compared to the 
socially optimal solution according to Vives (1997) lies in the informational externality 
produced by agents and their behavior in the market based model. When agents respond to 
their private information they reveal it at least partly the other agents assisting the aggregation 
of information in the economy. Agents do not however take this positive information 
externality that increases the value of public information into account when making their 
individual decisions. According to Vives this externality is internalized in the socially optimal 
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model, which increases the value of publicly available information and decreases the 
probability of agents refraining to use only their own private information. 
As highlighted in Banerjee & Fudenberg (2004), the appearance of a sequence of agents who 
find the publicly available information to be of such low information value that they are 
forced to act on their private information can disrupt an ongoing herding process and 
ultimately prevent the asymptotic learning equilibrium that the system would have otherwise 
converged to. This aspect is also closely related to the “royal family” effects discussed above. 
In a situation where the existence of a prominent group of agents reduces the value of the 
information acquired by agents via sampling by so much that it is of little value to them, they 
might be forced to rely solely on the information provided to them by their own private 
signals. In turn, under different assumptions, it is also possible for the prominent group to 
dominate agents’ samples in such a way that the system will converge to the behavior of these 
so called opinion leaders. 
The area of interest where the welfare implications of social learning are naturally at their 
largest is the adoption of new customs innovations and technologies. As has been argued in 
social learning literature and discussed above, there are many factors that influence the 
diffusion of new ideas. The main conclusion to be made when considering the welfare effects 
of social learning and herd behavior is the need to identify the different factors that affect 
learning process and outcomes. The asymptotic learning outcomes, i.e. herding behavior, 
produced in the models reviewed above are quite robust, at least in a technical sense. They do 
not however say much about the determinants the actual targets of herding. In many herding 
models the direction of herding can even be completely arbitrarily determined, and as a result 
the likeliness of an efficient technology being adopted over an inefficient one can come down 
to mere chance. 
An important caveat to keep in mind when generalizing the results of social learning models 
to broader implications is that the models are best used to describe the conceivable 
convergence properties of the system and to describe the learning process resulting in herd 
behavior. These need nonetheless combined with careful analysis of the actual origins of the 
herd behavior, such as the actions of the first individual in a sequential decision model 
producing informational cascades to determine the direction of herding and the broader 
implications of such behavior. To further sharpen the picture on the effects of social learning, 
some of the welfare effects of social learning observed in real life situations are discussed 
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further in the next chapter, which focuses on presenting and reviewing the empirical and 
experimental evidence on herd behavior and social learning. 
3. Evidence for social learning 
The empirical feasibility of social learning models has been extensively studied in recent 
years, both experimentally and by utilizing the tools of modern econometric analysis. A large 
variety of experimental settings have been used to study social learning in a laboratory, 
particularly to identify the conditions that are favorable for informational cascades to develop. 
In this chapter, I first take a look at some of the important studies on informational cascades 
utilizing an experimental laboratory setting, after which I briefly discuss the substantial body 
of literature testing the social learning herd behavior hypotheses in the financial markets. The 
focus is then turned towards the role of advice in social learning and how it can affect social 
learning outcomes in the laboratory. Finally, this chapter finishes with the examination the 
issue of how do word of mouth and advice contribute to social learning and what implications 
does this have on behavior in the product markets. 
3.1 Herd behavior and rationality 
The seminal contribution to the empirical testing of social learning hypotheses on 
informational cascades and herd behavior is given by Anderson & Holt (1997), who in their 
laboratory experiments and subsequent econometric analysis test empirically the validity of 
the early theoretical contribution of Bikhchandani et al. (1992). Anderson & Holt’s 
experiments were one of the first attempts to test the feasibility of social learning theories of 
informational cascades in a controlled laboratory environment, and much of the subsequent 
empirical analysis of social learning has concentrated on replicating their original work and 
its different variations. 
The basic setting in Anderson & Holt involves asking a random sequence of individuals to 
correctly predict, based on their own private signal and the observation of the choice of the 
previous subject, which of the two urns containing different sets of colored balls was a ball 
drawn. The experimental setting intends to mimic the situation where subjects must predict 
which of two equally likely events has taken place after receiving a private signal implicating 
the relative probabilities and observing prediction of the previous subject. As in Bikchandani 
et al. (1992), the subject who is first to act must act based solely on his private signal and thus 
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reveal it to the other subjects. As one can see, the experimental setting matches closely the 
theoretical model of Bikhchandani et al. and allows the researchers to observe the formation 
of cascades, if they are subject to rise as the theory suggests. 
The findings of Anderson & Holt (1997) are very much in line with what the theory of 
Bikchandani et al (1992) predicts. In the experiments of Anderson & Holt, informational 
cascades were found to develop more than two thirds of the occasions when possible and in 
about one half of those cases the cascades led the subjects to herd towards the incorrect 
choice, acting on a misrepresentative private signal of the subject in the sequence. This result 
speaks strongly in favor of informational cascades being a considerable driver behind herd 
behavior, as in a laboratory environment other influential factors such as the subject’s 
inherent need for conformity among the group is minimized. In addition, in a study closely 
related to Anderson & Holt (1997), Çelen & Kariv (2004b) found that, while cascades tended 
to develop about one third out of times when possible, almost every time when they appeared 
they resulted in agents herding towards the correct payoff maximizing choice. Additional 
support for the findings of Anderson & Holt is also offered by Hung & Plott (2001), who vary 
the institutional setup to cover majority rule and conformity rewarding institutions. 
In the special setting of the financial markets, herding in the forms of booms and busts in the 
asset markets has been frequently observed throughout time. This could lead one to presume 
that for example bubbles and market crashes were caused by the same mechanisms of 
informational cascades and herd behavior. Although some studies have voiced concerns for 
the possibility of informational cascades to arise in a market setting, in the light of the resent 
findings the contemporary general consensus seems to be that, as argued by e.g. Drehmann, 
Oechssler & Roider (2005), the presence of a flexible market price is usually strong enough 
force to prevent herding. This view is also supported by the experimental tests of Cipriani & 
Guarino (2005) among others. 
Nevertheless there has been a tremendous amount of studies on herd behavior in the financial 
markets. The reason for this could be the huge financial effects that herding might produce or 
the fact that the findings on whether there are true herd behavior and informational cascades 
in the markets is still somewhat mixed. It is also important to remember that even in the case 
of no asset price speculation or herding, changes in asset price fundamentals can cause 
enormous movements in their pricess in a short amount of time. The separation of speculative 
 31 
 
or herd behavior driven price changes from those caused by fundamentals continues to be 
been a key challenge in this field. 
The empirical evidence from laboratory experiments seems to show strong support for herd 
behavior and the informational cascades theories. The evidence is much more inconclusive on 
the nature of the learning mechanism that real life agents utilize. The findings of Anderson & 
Holt (1997), and especially of Hung & Plott (2001), seem to validate the assumption of 
Bayesian rationality of subjects at least to an extent. Yet in their econometric analysis 
Anderson & Holt find indications that about a third of the subjects deviated from Bayes’ rule 
and used simple calculations to make inferences. This in turn made these subjects to rely more 
on their private signals compared to the public information offered by the predictions by other 
subjects. 
If Anderson & Holt found that a third of the subjects tended to deviate from Bayesian rational 
actions, Çelen & Kariv (2004b) go one step further and attribute the boundedly rational 
actions of the early movers in the behavioral sequence as the main reason for the development 
informational cascades in a laboratory environment. According to Çelen & Kariv the agents 
moving early in the sequence tended to overvalue their private information, which lead to it 
being more representative in the public information samples of subjects acting after them. 
Çelen & Kariv also found that subjects tended to put excessive weight on their private signals 
and private information compared to the publicly available set of information, but that in the 
long run the subjects’ actions tended to converge more towards what is predicted by assuming 
Bayesian inferences. 
Further support for overvaluing of private information and hence non-Bayesian decision rules 
is given by Weizsäcker (2010), who performed meta-analysis of 13 different social learning 
experiments to concur that in his sample the subjects tended to deviate from the actions 
suggested by their private information only, if the public information sample suggested a very 
high probability for their private sample to be misleading. In terms of agents making Bayesian 
inferences, theory would predict that such deviations would tend to occur already when the 
probability the private information being misleading reaches the level where the sample is 
right or wrong with equal probabilities. These findings of course raise doubts over the 
Bayesian rationality of the participating agents. As an explanation for these findings, Kübler 
& Weizsäcker (2004) offer egocentric bias, as in their experiments subjects tended to be 
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overconfident in the sense that they attributed a higher error rate to the predictions of others 
then to their own predictions. 
When testing for the bounds of agent’s rationality, researchers have found some interesting 
details. In their study Kübler & Weizsäcker (2004) modified the model of Anderson & Holt 
by introducing a small cost for agents to receive signals. The results were that, compared to 
the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the first agent purchasing the signal and every subsequent 
agent acting based on it, too many agents positioned at later stages of the sequence decided 
purchase a signal and violate Bayesian rationality. Based on this Kübler & Weizsäcker argue 
that the equilibrium of a game with costly signals is bound to depart from its Bayesian 
equilibrium more than a game where signals are costless. This implies that in the real world 
agents tend to be less than perfectly rational in many cases, as there are a number of 
applications where acquiring signals involves some kind of a cost. 
Exact conclusions on whether agents tend to implement a Bayesian rational or a boundedly 
rational decision rule are hard to make with the light of the current experimental evidence. 
The evidence does seem to imply that there are at least some bounds to the rationality of 
agents at least as a whole. An interesting and seemingly very robust finding has been that 
allowing subjects to offer verbal information in the form of advice increases rationality of 
agents. This factor will be explored more in the next section where learning from advice and 
word of mouth is discussed. 
3.2 Learning from advice 
As was briefly mentioned in chapter 2, word of mouth communication and advice can have 
significant effects on social learning outcomes. As previously discussed, word of mouth has 
been used in theoretical models to successfully facilitate information aggregation between 
agents to a great extent. In the above discussions on asymptotic learning it was assumed that 
the informational value of observing the actions of previous agents to be roughly equal to the 
information value of receiving verbal advice from those agents and that social learning can be 
facilitated with both methods of information transmission. This has also been the common 
approach in the theoretical social learning literature. Keeping this in mind, some of the recent 
laboratory experiments on social learning have attained some interesting results on how 
agents actually seem to value the information they receive through word of mouth advice 
compared to the information they obtain through observing the choices of their peers. 
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3.2.1 Power of advice 
From a theoretical standpoint the value of advice of course depends on its information content 
and the value of that information. The receivers of advice are usually unable to determine the 
value of the information they receive before putting the advice into action and acting on it. 
Therefore the ex-ante value that agents assign to advice they receive is in reality affected by 
the credibility of the advice giver. In real life situations people tend to, at least in theory, put a 
higher value to the advice given by experts who are known to be knowledgeable on the 
subject at hand. This could plausibly lead to the advice of these experts carrying more weight 
compared to the advice given by someone who is considered to possess an ordinary level of 
knowledge, and thus also to carry more weight than observing the actions of these other naïve 
agents. The theory however also predicts that after controlling for the information value of 
observing actions and observing advice the two should carry equal weight in the decision 
making process’ of agents. 
Yet, some recent studies on social learning in a laboratory environment have found that 
agents actually tend to ceteris paribus weigh more heavily the advice they receive from their 
fellow naïve participants than the information they receive from observing their actions. This 
is a rather interesting result considering that the informational value of the two should be 
equal by experiment design. In their recent study on the effects of advice on social learning in 
the laboratory Çelen et al. (2010) construct three different types of simple social learning 
experiments with sequential actions to test for the subjects’ willingness to follow the actions 
and/or advice of their predecessors and the possible payoff increasing or decreasing effects of 
receiving advice. 
The main findings of Çelen, et al. (2010) are that subjects appear to be more willing to follow 
the advice of their predecessor than to copy their action. Moreover, the presence of advice 
seems to have significant positive effect on the subjects’ payoffs and welfare. What makes 
this result somewhat surprising is that the experimental setting of Çelen et al. was such that 
both the advice given by predecessors and their actions observed by the successors were both 
in binary form, resulting in making the informational value of observing advice and observing 
actions to in all relevant aspects identical. All participating subjects were also considered not 
to be experts on the subject and thud to give naïve advice that should ex-ante be no more 
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informative than the advice given by any other agent, including advice that would have been 
given by the agent receiving the advice in question. 
Çelen et al. (2010) also found some noteworthy effects in terms of welfare implications as 
well. The presence of advice was found to considerably improve the accuracy of decision 
makers and to increase their payoffs compared to situations where they didn’t receive any 
advice. The reason for this as argued by Çelen et al. was that the subjects tended to disagree 
less with their predecessors advice than their actions, increasing the number of subjects 
following the advice of their predecessors in situations where the signal received from the 
predecessor conflicted with the subjects own private signal. According to Çelen et al. the 
implication of this was that in their sequential model over time the individuals would start to 
rely more on the advice they received then to their own private signals. 
Considering the impact of advice giving on the rationality of the subjects’ behavior, the 
presence of advice has been found to induce the participants to act more according to 
economic theory than those participants who didn’t receive advice. This result has been 
argued at least by Schotter (2003), who reviews a set economic games played by the subjects 
across a set of experiments. The reason for this improved rationality was argued by Schotter 
to be the fact that the process of giving or receiving advice forces the subjects to assess their 
positions differently. The subjects seemed to learn better, i.e. make better predictions, when 
they were forced to either advice someone or to receive advice before making a decision. The 
exact cognitive process of how including the advice factor into the decision problem 
enhanced the learning of agents is not clear, but one plausible explanation is that it made the 
agent’s re-asses their first hand opinions and to therefore spend more cognitive effort on 
making the decision. 
Most of Celen et al.’s (2010) results receive strong support from the earlier paper by Schotter 
(2003), who surveyed previous laboratory experiments on social learning and arrived to 
similar conclusions in terms that the subjects did tend to be more willing follow the advice of 
naïve advisors than to copy their actions. Schotter even goes as far as arguing that, based on 
the experiments he analyzes, agents generally prefer to rather receive advice from the 
individual preceding them than to receive the same set of information that the preceding 
individual had when he or she had made the recommendation. This result is intriguing in 
many respects. Individuals are usually thought to be more prone to being egocentric and 
overconfident on their own abilities than the exact opposite suggested by this finding. At the 
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very least, a rational agent would in all likeliness put at least as much faith in his/her own 
conclusions on the agent’s optimal as to those made by another agent. 
Why then would an individual think that another ex-ante similar individual would be able to 
make a better decision than he/she himself/herself could make? The exact answer for this is 
not yet completely clear. Çelen et al. (2010) suggest that this might be because the receiver of 
the advice assumes that the advisor has put more effort on formulating the advice, e.g. for 
reputational reasons than an individual contemplating his/her own action would. Other 
reasons might lie in the unknown parts of our cognitive structures that make us weigh verbal 
information in the form of advice more heavily in comparison obtaining information through 
observing actions. Future research can hopefully share more light into exactly are the driving 
forces behind the power of advice. 
3.2.2 Social ties 
An important consideration regarding Schotter’s (2003) results on the enhanced rationality of 
behavior when the subjects must give or receive advice is that, in the particular experimental 
setting forming the basis of the result, the both advisor and receiver of advice were both 
simultaneously present. This could have had an effect on the results as both sides might then 
consider reputational issues, which could have affected their decisions and increased the effort 
level exerted by the subjects. The quality of learning by the advisor, and hence the quality of 
his/her advice, might have been worse if there were no personal contact or asocial tie between 
the advisor and receiver of the advice. In the modern age of internet where word of mouth 
advice from sources that we have nonexistent social ties with is more and more abundant as 
well as important, this is one of the aspects of word of mouth facilitated social learning that is 
increasing in its significance, but still remains largely undefined. 
The generally held belief on the importance of social ties to word of mouth is that closer the 
social tie, more influence will the advice or word of mouth between the agents have. 
Historically the influence of word of mouth that we produce has been mostly restricted to our 
family, friends and acquaintances that we deal with in our daily interactions. With the rise of 
the internet, this has however changed completely. Through the internet and the through the 
various channels and platforms it facilitates people are now able to reach and share messages 
with literally millions of people. The implications of this to e.g. the marketing- and public 
relations practices of companies are tremendous, and, due to the rapid rise of these new 
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technological possibilities firms, consumers and academics alike are only beginning to realize 
the full potential of these new mediums. 
As of yet, there has not been much research done on comparing the effects of technology 
facilitated advice, such as advice given via the internet ,and more traditional forms of word of 
mouth advice. One of the few studies that have taken a look at the matter is Steffes & Burgee 
(2009), who compared the effects of receiving advice on which professor to choose for a 
collage course from different sources. Their somewhat surprising results were that, when 
choosing a professor, students tended to weigh most, not only their personal experiences, but 
also advice they received from an anonymous source on a website. These two sources were 
found to be more important than receiving traditional forms of word of mouth. What makes 
the results so interesting is the fact that students put more weight on the anonymous word of 
mouth on the internet than to traditional word of mouth from, not only people they have weak 
social ties to, such as their academic advisor, but also from people they have strong social ties 
with, such as their friends. 
The results of Steffes & Burgee (2009) are interesting because the traditional theoretical view 
on the effects of social ties on the rating of advice, as expressed in Brown & Reingen (1987) 
among others, is that a stronger social tie between individuals results in a bigger ability for 
one to influence the other. This might very well be true in the setting of traditional face to 
face interaction, and Steffes & Burgee did find that traditional word of mouth from 
individuals that the subjects had close social ties carried more weight than word of mouth 
from individuals with weak ties. The interesting factor is the high relative appreciation for 
internet word of mouth. In a related study on the effects of online reviews on book sales, 
Chevalier & Mayzlin (2006) found that written user reviews had more power in determining 
sales than simple average rankings. This would imply that, while the weight carried by online 
word of mouth can be considerable, the impact of the message is correlated with its 
resemblance to the traditional forms of word of mouth. 
3.3 Product markets 
The importance of word of mouth for promotion and product sales has been recognized in 
marketing for decades now. Adding the recent findings on the power of naïve advice 
discussed above, it is clear that word of mouth in its various forms has great implications for 
companies and their marketing strategies. Personal advice has always been an important 
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factor in human decision making, whether in determining which restaurant to go to, which 
school to enroll your children in or which neighborhood to move into. In recent years the 
importance of naïve advice has also grown immensely through the development of the 
internet and range of possibilities it offers.  
Internet has not only opened new possibilities for marketers and product manufacturers to 
spread information about their products, but it has also made possible for people to acquire 
relevant information on different products and to share their views to the masses e.g. through 
different kinds of online product reviews and recommendations. The usefulness of word of 
mouth to the diffusion of new technologies and new products has also been recognized in 
marketing literature, and word of mouth effects are for instance an important part of most 
widely accepted product diffusion models, such as the Bass’ (1969) infamous s-shaped 
diffusion model. That being said, even if the existence of word of mouth influence has been 
recognized, it has proven to be very hard to quantify these effects and their exact influence on 
sales.  
3.3.1 Word of mouth and sales 
The exact relationship between word of mouth and product sales has proven to be hard to 
quantify. One of the main reasons for this lies in the inherent endogeneity between the two. 
Just as it is plausible to assume that positive word of mouth has a positive effect on the 
demand for a product, it is also plausible that strong sales figures themselves can help to 
create positive word of mouth, hence creating a cycle that blurs observations on the true 
direction of the causality. Further challenges to the matter brings the difficulties in measuring 
word of mouth delivered in traditional conversations and determining the aspect, in terms of 
e.g. quality or quantity, of communication to measure. 
Presumably due to the difficulties in measuring and quantifying word of mouth and linking it 
into product sales outcomes, there has not been much research produced on it, at least in the 
field of economics. Thankfully with the surface of the internet and its many channels for word 
of mouth communication it has become easier to measure at least the kind of word of mouth it 
facilitates. The empirical findings on the effects of online word of mouth on product sales 
have been mixed. Some studies on the subject have found that positive word of mouth does in 
fact have a positive effect on product sales, while others have found no considerable effect to 
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be present. The determination of such causalities can naturally be complicated as there are 
numerous factors besides word of mouth that can affect product sales. 
One of the more convincing cases for word of mouth influencing product sales is made by 
Chevalier & Mayzlin (2006), who examined the effects of online book reviews on their sales 
figures in online bookstores. Their findings were that, as one would suspect, having a higher 
rating had a positive effect on the relative sales of the book and that negative ratings carried 
more weight in relation to positive ones. As mentioned before, Chevalier & Mayzlin also 
found written reviews by naïve advisors and other customers to be more influential than 
simple rankings based on user ratings. One possible explanation for this could be that the 
written reviews either carried more information or allowed the readers to assimilate 
themselves with the advice givers, increasing the influence of the advice and making the 
online word of mouth more similar to traditional word of mouth. 
Some reservations on the results of Chevalier & Mayzlin (2006) is required by the fact that in 
the underlying data the customers would receive the word of mouth information only after 
going to the bookstore website and hence were probably already considering purchasing at 
least some of the products for sale. This means that it remains unclear whether word of mouth 
was indeed the driving force behind the customer’s decision to purchase a book in the first 
place or just a parameter of their decision rule on determining which kind of book they were 
going to buy, i.e. the brand of the product they were going to purchase. It is a topic in need of 
some further research and further evidence on how much of an influence can word of mouth 
have on sparking the initial purchase intention or should it be seen as more directing the 
demand already formed toward particular types and brands. 
The results of Chevalier & Mayzlin (2006) are contrasted by the findings of Duan, et al. 
(2008), who found that, after accounting for possible endogeneity in word of mouth and 
demand, the ratings given in online movie reviews had no significant effect on the movie’s 
box office demand. Duan et al. did however find that the box office revenues were positively 
affected by the sheer volume of the online word of mouth. This sort of awareness effect is an 
important finding, not only because it verifies the common marketing knowledge of boosting 
demand by creating knowledge and “buzz” on the product, but also because it is a step in the 
right direction in determining the most important demand affecting components of word of 
mouth. 
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Although the conventional wisdom, and a view supported by Chevalier & Mayzlin (2006), is 
that negative word of mouth is weighed more heavily than positive, in their study of the 
effects of negative- and positive word of mouth on reported brand purchase probabilities East, 
Hammond & Lomax (2008) found positive word of mouth to carry relatively more weight. 
They also found that the effects of word of mouth on the probability of purchase were greatly 
dependent on the underlying probabilities. The result of positive word of mouth being more 
influential than negative East et al. attribute to the familiarity of the brand in question and 
argued that in relation positive word of mouth offers more diagnostic value than negative 
word of mouth, because the familiarity of the product attenuates the diagnostic value of 
negative information. 
The results achieved by East, Hammond & Lomax (2008) on the relative impacts of positive 
and negative word of mouth are certainly debatable. There is however also another key 
concept in their work that deserves attention. In the work of East et al. there were significant 
signs of anchoring effects in the terms of resisting word of mouth that countered the 
receiver’s current opinions. This implicates that all word of mouth is not created equal. Not 
only in its objective quality, but also in terms of how well it fits the opinions of the receiver. 
Furthermore, it implies that word of mouth could be better used in enhancing current 
customer loyalty rather than to successfully acquire new customers with it. 
3.3.2 Firm performance 
In terms of company performance, there has not been much successful work in quantifying 
the costs and benefits of word of mouth. When comparing the financial effects of different 
customer loyalty metrics, Morgan & Rego (2006) find that the quantity of word of mouth in 
terms of the average number of recommendations does have a positive impact on the future 
market share of the company, but that it also has a negative impact on the company’s future 
gross margins. As a reason for this Morgan & Rego suggest the large financial costs related to 
generating positive word of mouth. More and more companies do however engage 
proactively in word of mouth generation nowadays and try to seed the markets with positive 
information. This can of course be a successful strategy for some firms, but the industry wide 
effects and financial returns on word of mouth are yet to be clearly determined. 
As the company wide and industry wide performance effects of word of mouth remain 
somewhat ambiguous, establishing a clear link between word of mouth and company 
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financial performance remains as an intriguing avenue for further research, one which is 
unfortunately outside the scope of this thesis. One of the most appealing characteristics of 
word of mouth generated consideration and awareness is its low cost structure in terms of 
possibly attracting large amounts of consumer attention for relatively small amounts monetary 
investments. The topic of how to seed a market with word of mouth communication to create 
positive product hype is an active topic among marketing researchers and has also been 
incorporated in some product- and technology diffusion models. Even if the benefits of 
positive word of mouth seem to be clear for everyone, the hard part remains to be linking the 
small micro level effects of word of mouth distribution to company performance and even 
further to market level industry performance. 
In conclusion, there is still a lot of work to be done in identifying the effects of word of mouth 
on demand behavior and product sales. Some reasonable attempts have been made, but the 
exact causalities between word of mouth, product sales, and firm performance still continues 
to elude us. Due to the numerous difficulties that are involved in isolating these effects, there 
are still challenges to be met in the future. Hopefully the ever growing amount of data coming 
from online platforms allows us to gain further insight on the matter. Still, further attempts 
should be made to gain more insight on the effects of word of mouth advice on social 
learning, and the implications that it might have in real world markets. The rest of this thesis 
aims to contribute to our understanding of word of mouth by examining the effects of word of 
mouth learning in the context of the smartphone market via examining the determinants of the 
effectiveness of word of mouth at the individual consumer level and investigating the market 
share effects of positive word of mouth at the market level. 
4. Smartphone market data 
This chapter lays out the foundations for the empirical analysis of this thesis by pointing out 
some of the key characterizing determinants of the smartphone industry and by describing the 
smartphone market data used in the empirical analyses of this thesis. The empirical section of 
the thesis is based on the analysis of data from two different datasets, one consisting mainly 
from recent sales figures of smartphone devices and the other consisting of survey data 
gathered via a consumer survey on related brand awareness. This chapter proceeds with a 
description of the smartphone industry and its key characteristics. As the industry is in many 
ways different from other more traditional industries, a brief description of some of its key 
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demand determining characteristics will help to give context to the subsequent analysis. After 
the above mentioned industry description, the datasets used in the empirical analysis of the 
thesis are described in more detail. 
4.1. Market description 
The rise of the mobile industry has been one of the most prominent economic developments 
in the world during the last two decades. The advances in mobile technology are widely seen 
as one of the main drivers and facilitators of economic growth in the near future. The roots of 
the contemporary smartphone industry are rooted in the mobile phone industry that preceded 
it and still somewhat continues to coexist with it today. The shift from the earlier mobile 
phones, aptly described as “feature phones” due them mostly being a sum of their features, to 
devices labeled as “smartphones” with more cross functional usability has been gradual and 
relatively seamless. The feature phone market is still vibrant in many countries, and many of 
the same companies producing smartphones also produce feature phones as well. As new 
technological advances are discovered the center of gravity of the industry will however keep 
shifting more and more towards these the so called smartphones and other smart devices. 
The significance of smartphones and their economic impact is not limited to the industry itself 
as they can well be seen as contributing to economic growth in additional ways via facilitating 
communication and information sharing. As modern economies move more and more heavily 
into information based economies with ever bigger share of the economy consisting of the 
services sector, smartphones can be seen as facilitating the development of new business 
models that utilizing them and acting as production inputs for many other firms and 
industries. As of today, smartphones can credibly be seen as the focal point of the technology 
industry and their significance is generally believed to only grow in the future as the devices 
gain more and more users. 
The boundaries of the smartphone industry are extremely hard to classify for a number of 
reasons, not least for there being a huge amount of overlap with many other categories of 
products with similar uses and functionality. On one hand, the smartphone market overlaps 
with the mobile phone market as both types of devices can be used to make phone calls and 
also share many of the same basic functionalities. On the other hand, the smartphone market 
also heavily overlaps with the tablet market, and to a degree even with the laptop market, as 
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well, as both types of devices have relatively similar in functionality, with the main 
differences coming from device size, screen size and performance related issues. 
Furthermore, as mentioned, it is highly plausible that in some markets smartphones compete 
of the same customers as notebooks and other types of personal computers. This can be seen 
to be a plausible scenario especially in the developing world, where due to income constraints 
households might consider buying only a single device to use for communication and 
connecting to the internet. In addition to significant amount of overlap among between these 
closely related markets there are other factors including constant market expansion and 
uncertainties about future developments that complicate the estimating the size of smartphone 
market. To give a rough idea of the market’s size and significance, according to the 
technology research firm Gartner (2013), more than 200 million smartphones were sold 
worldwide in the last quarter of 2012 alone and globally the size of the market is expected to 
grow substantially, especially in the emerging markets. 
As stated before, the smartphone market is very unique in many of its characteristics. 
Smartphones as products can be seen as simultaneously possessing the characteristics of 
multiple products sold in a bundle. The final user experience that the buyer purchases is 
distinctly determined jointly by the hardware, software and the ecosystem of the product in 
question. Some of the industry participants are vertically integrated and control all three of the 
main aspects of their product. Others have paired- or grouped up to jointly contribute to the 
production of the end product, and hence do not have complete control over their eventual 
user offering. Further complicating the situation is the fact that the quality of an operation 
system is undoubtedly tied to the quality of its ecosystem, which is in part determined by the 
amount and quality of applications produced by third party developers. 
The degree of vertical integration and the degree of control over the end product is one of the 
important separating factors among smartphone producers. Some producers, such as Apple, 
are fully vertically integrated in terms of providing the hardware, the software and the 
ecosystem, while others like Nokia and Samsung mainly produce only the hardware 
component of the product and rely on software and ecosystems provided by Microsoft and 
Google respectively. While the data used in the econometric work of this thesis is based on 
sales figures of smartphone handsets, which can be seen as being a bundle of the handset, the 
operating system and the ecosystem it possesses, the handset sales data can be seen as 
accurately representing the sales numbers of smartphone operations systems as well, which, 
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rather than the handset market shares, are the factor of interest in the subsequent empirical 
analysis. The relative weighing of the significance of each of the parts of the smartphone 
product bundle of course varies from one consumer to another, but the choice of the 
combination of operating system and the ecosystem that is tied to is without a doubt an 
important enough piece of the puzzle to merit further empirical analysis. 
On the device manufacturer side of the market there are numerous players producing different 
handsets, but from an operating system standpoint practically the whole market can be seen as 
utilizing one of the four most popular operation systems that according to information 
technology research firm IDC (2013) are Google’s Android, Apples iOS, Microsoft’s 
Windows Phone (WP) or BlackBerry made by the similarly named company. Each of these 
operating systems comes with their own ecosystem in terms of connectivity and applications 
and represents a distinctly different product offering. Importantly, they are also limited to be 
sold with certain set of handsets depending on the operation system. When Google’s android 
and Microsoft’s Windows Phone operating systems can be purchased with a wide variety of 
handsets from different manufacturers, at the other end of the spectrum iOS and BlackBerry 
operating systems can only be purchased with a bundle with a device from a certain 
manufacturer, Apple and BlackBerry respectively. 
Another major factor in the nature of competition in smartphone market and perhaps 
something that draws it apart from some of the more conventional industries is the hyper 
competitive nature of competition in which the winner captures a lion’s share of the market. 
There are of course other markets that can be described as an oligopoly with few of the largest 
players holding most of the market, but what makes the smartphone market unique is the 
speed that changes in the market structure can and frequently do occur. The hypercompetitive 
nature of the market guarantees that the margin of errors for the producers of handsets and 
operation systems is extremely slim and the cutthroat competition ensures that no means of 
competition from aggressive pricing to patent lawsuits are being left unused. 
The hypercompetitive nature of the smartphone markets implies a high sensitivity in market 
outcomes to small changes in outcome determinants such as word of mouth. Due to the 
hypercompetitive winner takes all nature of the market, even slight increases in positive word 
of mouth recommending a product could have large effects on market outcomes. The bundle-
like nature of smartphones as a product and the significant network effects that are related to 
their ecosystems, both in terms of connecting users with other people as well as locking users 
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into using products in a specific ecosystem, make word of mouth recommendations an 
important factor in determining shifts in product sales and the possible long term market 
equilibrium. Especially in new markets can word of mouth have a strong influence on product 
market shares via affecting the initial purchase decisions of consumers who are deciding on 
which of the available ecosystems to enter. After purchasing a device and entering an 
ecosystem there can be considerable costs involved with switching to using a device from 
another ecosystem.  
The relative market shares of the four main smartphone operating systems vary from market 
to market and in most markets there are also some niche products being sold with other 
operation systems. There is also significant variance between the market shares of the 
operation systems between different price points. Some operation systems such as iOS are 
also simply not available in all markets and all price points. Nevertheless, the recent sales of 
other operation systems apart from the four most popular operations systems have been of 
negligible importance at the market level. According to the information technology research 
firm IDC (2013) the four main operation systems made up more than 96.9 percent of the 
smartphone operation systems sold in the last quarter of 2012, implying that the four biggest 
players in the operation system market hence make up the whole market to a degree that they 
can be seen as accurately representing the whole market in the context of this thesis. In more 
depth the smartphone market data used in the empirical analysis for this thesis and its sources 
are examined in the next section, which concentrates on data and its sources. 
4.2 Data sources 
The empirical part of this thesis is based on the analysis of data originally coming from two 
different sources, each dataset describing the different aspects of the smartphone market. The 
first set of data, market tracking dataset, consisted mainly of observations of smartphone sales 
figures in different markets. The second set of data, Brand Relationship Tracker survey data, 
on the other hand consisted of consumer survey data on brand awareness and brand loyalty. 
For the empirical analyses of the thesis the Brand Relationship Tracker data was first utilized 
separately for the analysis of the effectiveness of word of mouth advice, after which the Brand 
Relationship Tracker datasets was combined with operation system market share information 
calculated from the market tracking dataset to produce a panel dataset for the analysis of 
operation system market shares. 
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The final panel dataset used in analyzing changes in operation system market shares consisted 
of strongly balanced panel dataset with monthly observations from 14 different countries 
representing a well-balanced sample of different smartphone markets over the time period of 
18 months spanning from July 2011 to December 2012. The same set of countries and same 
time period were also used for the advice rating analysis that utilized only the survey data 
from the Brand Relationship Tracker dataset. A list of countries and the number of 
observations from each country used in the advice rating and market share analysis are 
presented in appendix 1 in Table 6 and Table 7 respectively. Table 6 represents the final 
dataset for the advice rating analysis via the Heckman selection model constructed from the 
Brand relationship tracker data. Table 7 represents the final panel dataset for the market share 
analysis, which included data from both the Brand Relationship Tracker data and the market 
tracking data. The two sources of data from which the data for this thesis was gathered are 
described in more detail below. 
4.2.1 Market tracking data 
The dataset containing market tracking data of smartphone sales was collected by the GfK 
group, one of the largest market research groups in the world, and is based on tracking 
smartphone handset sales to consumers in retail outlets in the selected markets across the 
globe. In practice the final monthly sales numbers included in the data are calculated for each 
smartphone handset through extrapolation of observed sales figures. As tracking every single 
individual retail outlet is somewhat impossible due to practicality restrictions, GfK can only 
partially observe the actual sales numbers in each market. The retail sales coverage of 
observations also varies from one market to another. To reach the market representative final 
sales volumes for each handset in each market the observed sales volumes are extrapolated to 
market representing volumes through GfK’s estimated coverage of the retail network in the 
specific country. 
In addition to the sales numbers of different models and defining model characteristics, the 
market tracking data also included the estimated nonsubsidized retail prices for the different 
models smartphones and the operation system of each device. For the purpose of being 
included in the operation system market share analysis the sales monthly device sales figures 
of handsets were aggregated to operation system and country level to calculate the market 
shares of the four operation systems used in the analysis in each of the 14 countries in each of 
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the 18 periods from July 2011 to December 2012. As previously explained, to facilitate 
market share analysis, the aggregated sales data from the market tracking dataset was 
subsequently added to the Brand Relationship Tracker dataset. 
4.2.2 Brand Relationship Tracker data 
The Brand Relationship Tracker dataset consisted of data gathered via a consumer survey and 
was collected by the device manufacturer Nokia, one of the world’s biggest smartphone 
manufacturers and a key participant in the smartphone market. The Brand Relationship 
Tracker survey is collected monthly by Nokia and includes questions related to brand 
awareness and preferences for consumers who either own a smartphone or a more traditional 
mobile phone and or are determined to purchase one in the next 12 months. The dataset used 
for the analysis of the effectiveness of advice with the Heckman selection model only 
included observations of consumers who already owned a smartphone. The data on the Brand 
Relationship Tracker dataset was collected via a consumer survey that was carried out 25 
different markets across the globe, 14 of which are featured in the analyses if this thesis. As 
previously mentioned, both the Brand Relationship Tracker dataset as well as the market 
tracking dataset included observations from the time period of 18 months between July 2011 
and December 2012. 
In markets where the proportion of the population with online access is representative of the 
general population in the country the survey interviews were conducted online. In countries 
where the online population is not representative of the general population the survey was 
conducted either via face to face interviews or a mixture of face to face interviews and an 
online survey. To facilitate the generalization of the survey results to apply to the general 
population of the country and the market, in the analyses of this thesis the survey results were 
also weighed with population representation weights to make the data reflect population 
characteristics and to make the results applicable to the whole markets and their participants 
as a whole. 
The survey questions in the Brand Relationship Tracker survey that were used to measure 
consumer experiences on receiving advice on a smartphone purchase and form the basis of the 
data used for the Heckman selection model used to for the empirical analysis of advice ratings 
are presented in appendix 2. The characteristics of the data that are relevant in terms of the 
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empirical analysis of this thesis will be discussed more in the next chapter, which will outline 
the empirical framework of the thesis. 
5. Empirical framework 
This chapter begins by defining the thesis’ main empirical research questions derived from 
theory and by relating them to their broader context of social learning theories and empirical 
literature presented in the previous chapters. After defining the main research objectives for 
the empirical analysis the focus is turned towards econometric modeling and the main models 
for the empirical analysis part of this thesis are presented. The Heckman selection model that 
is used to study the effectiveness of advice is presented first, after which the panel data 
models used to study the effects of word of mouth on operation system market shares are 
presented. The purpose of this chapter is to define the appropriate empirical framework used 
to study the main research questions of the thesis and to construct a base on which the 
empirical results of the analyses can be discussed in the next chapter. 
The paramount economic theories of social learning that were laid out in chapter 2 were 
mostly concerned with the features and characteristics facilitating herd behavior. As 
discussed, one of the possible means of facilitating information aggregation among agents is 
word of mouth advice. The different theoretical settings where word of mouth can facilitate 
asymptotic learning were already discussed in chapter 2, but the direct implication of the 
models is that under suitable circumstances word of mouth can cause significant herding 
among agents towards a common choice when faced with a similar decision problem. The 
conditions for herding, efficient or inefficient in terms of agent payoffs and welfare, to arise 
were discussed in depth in chapter two and, for the empirical analysis section of the thesis the 
interest is concentrated on the real world implications of the numerous theoretical models of 
social learning. 
As pointed out by the previous empirical and experimental literature on social learning and 
the role of word of mouth advice in experimental and real world situations discussed in 
chapter 3, the herding outcomes of social learning theories also appear to be robust in real life 
as well. This being said, the body of empirical literature on word of mouth facilitated social 
learning applied in a real life market situation is still scarce. The objective of this thesis is 
hence to contribute to this body of research by studing the effects of word of mouth advice 
and word of mouth facilitated learning in the real world setting of smartphone markets. The 
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smartphone markets can be considered very suitable for such an analysis due to their high 
level of competition, rapid market dynamics and the large quantities of word of mouth advice 
between consumers for facilitating information aggregation. 
5.1. Research questions 
The main empirical research questions of the thesis are two folded. First, this thesis seeks to 
clarify the factors that determine the influence of word of mouth advice and answer the 
question of where does the most valuable word of mouth advice come from. Second, in 
addition to examining these micro level effects of word of mouth, this thesis also seeks to 
determine some of the broader market level implications of word of mouth and answer the 
question of how does word of mouth advice affect the relative market shares of smartphone 
operation systems. The empirical analysis part of the thesis will begin by examining the 
individual consumer aspect of word of mouth and in regard to the effectiveness of word of 
mouth advice, from where the natural progression will be to examine the aggregated effects of 
the individual level effects on the scale of the whole market. 
The first of the main research questions is interested with the effects of word of mouth advice 
from the consumer’s perspective. It intends to clarify the determinants of valuable advice in 
terms of the sources and channels from which word of mouth is received. In the sample of 
consumer survey data of smartphone owners used for empirical analysis almost two thirds of 
the respondents reported their choice of smartphone being influenced by word of mouth 
advice. In the empirical analysis sections of the thesis I seek to determine the effects of 
sources and channels from where word of mouth advice is received on the valuations given to 
that advice. I seek to find what type of word of mouth consumers perceive as most valuable in 
providing them useful information for their purchase decision, where did it come from, from 
whom did it come from, and whether or not the advice was actively sought. 
The second the main research question deals with the aggregated market effects of word of 
mouth facilitated social learning in a real world market by seeking to understand the effects of 
word of mouth facilitated social learning on the market shares of smartphone operations 
systems. The intention is to shed light to any possible effects of word of mouth on the market 
equilibrium and dynamics. As previous empirical research on this topic is so limited the 
emphasis of this study is on defining and understanding the basic underlying principles of 
word of mouth advice’s market wide effects. One of the key aspects in the second research 
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question is whether or not word of mouth advice will facilitate the kind of herding towards a 
particular choice of brand that is implied by many social learning theories. 
To seek answers to the research questions laid out above, the research questions are studied 
through the empirical analysis of relevant data related to the smartphone market. Other 
relevant factors of interest in the context of this thesis will be discussed in later chapters as the 
need arises. In the next sections devoted to methodology I will present the empirical models 
of the thesis and describe how they can be used to study the thesis’ research questions and the 
other relevant factors of interest. The purpose of the methodology sections is to describe the 
empirical methods of the thesis in enough depth to facilitate the discussion of the results of 
the analysis in the next chapter. 
As the research questions of the thesis are two folded in terms of examining the micro level 
and market wide effects of word of mouth, and the datasets utilized in their analysis differ, the 
methodology of the thesis involves two different classes of models. The determinants for the 
individual level effectiveness of word of mouth advice are examining through the well-known 
Heckman selection model, while the panel data analysis of the market share effects of word of 
mouth are is conducted utilizing an ordinary least squares specification, a fixed effects 
specification and a random effects specification. Starting with the Heckman selection model, 
these model specifications will be presented in the remaining sections of this chapter. 
5.2. Heckman selection model 
This section specifies the structure and methodology for the Heckman selection model of the 
thesis. It also describes the key variables of interest in the model and discusses the important 
factors related to observing the marginal effects of these variables as well as other relevant 
modeling related factors. The purpose of the Heckman selection model is to facilitate the 
analysis of how ratings given for word of mouth advice are affected by a group of 
independent variables related to the source of the advice and the setting of information 
aggregation. 
An important attribute of the Brand Relationship Tracker dataset is that the data was 
generated through the means of a survey questionnaire, and not all participants had received 
advice in their purchase decision when purchasing their smartphone. Due to this there is a 
distinct possibility for a sample selection bias to severely hinder the estimation of the 
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effectiveness of word of mouth advice in the whole population. Because only the ratings for 
advice of those subjects that actually did receive advice are observed, it is impossible to know 
the ratings that the part of the population that did not receive advice would have given if they 
in fact had received advice. This means that, if not corrected for this sample selection bias, the 
estimation results for are not generalizable to the whole population surveyed or to the general 
public. 
This kind of problem with sample selection bias is typical in empirical work dealing with 
either non-representative or truncated samples. Thankfully there has been different ways for 
controlling this sample selection bias been presented by in econometrics literature. A widely 
accepted method for controlling for sample selection bias called the Heckman selection 
model, also known as the Heckman correction, was developed by the economics Nobel 
laureate James Heckman in the later part of the 1970’s and has been applied extensively in 
empirical research ever since. The idea behind the Heckman selection model as laid out in e.g. 
Heckman (1979) is to deal with the sample selection bias as an omitted variable problem and 
to divide the analysis of behavioral relationships into two parts. 
In the first part of the two stage estimator, a selection model for the probability of an 
observation being included in the sample is estimated, typically through a probit regression. 
In the second stage of the two stage estimator the selection bias is corrected via transforming 
the probabilities of being included in the sample into an additional explanatory variable 
trough the inverse Mills ratio, also known as Heckman’s lambda. The inverse Mills ratio, 
defined as the ratio of the probability density function to the cumulative distribution function 
of a distribution is then used as an additional independent variable in the estimation of the 
outcome model to determine true behavioral relationships in the population. As is evident, the 
inverse Mills ratio included in the outcome equation of the estimator represents the effects of 
an omitted variable on the independent variable of interest, namely the effects probability of 
being included in the selected sample. 
5.2.1 Model specification 
In the context of this thesis the Heckman selection model is used to study how the subjects 
rated the advice they received when searching for their current smartphone device. Drawing 
from Heckman (1979), a formal description of the two part Heckman selection model to be 
estimated is given by following of set of equations: 
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          (5.1) 
   
            (5.2) 
where   and    are vectors of independent variables and   and    are jointly bivariate 
normally distributed error terms. Equation (5.1) and (5.2) above respectively represents the 
selection equation and the outcome equation of the Heckman selection model. In the selection 
equation (5.1)   
  indicates whether the person has received advice, in which case   
   , or 
whether the person has not received any advice, in which case   
   . The main variable of 
interest is   
 , the dependent variable in the outcome equation, which denotes the ratings given 
to the received advice. An important notion is that the main variable of interest   
  is only 
observable and included in the observation if the person has in fact actually received any 
advice and   
   . 
To estimate the model the selection equation outlined above is estimated using a probit 
regression of the form: 
  (    |  )   (    )  (5.3) 
where    =1 indicates that the person has received advice,   is a vector of explanatory 
variables,    is a vector of unknown parameters and  is the cumulative distribution function 
of the standard normal distribution After the estimation of the selection equation the inverse 
Mills ratio   can then be calculated as the ratio of the probability density function to the 
cumulative distribution function: 
   
 (    )
 (    )
  (5.4) 
where   and   denote the probability density function and cumulative distribute function 
respectively. 
After the calculation of the inverse Mills ratio,   is then added as an independent variable to 
the outcome equation (5.2). Finally, the outcome equation is then estimated trough a 
maximum likelihood ordered probit procedure. According to Verbeek (2008), in this setting 
the Maximization of the loglikelihood function for the outcome with respect to the unknown 
parameters will lead to consistent and asymptotically efficient estimators that have an 
asymptotic normal distribution. Verbeek also points out that not observing the actual 
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correction term   is not a threat to the validity model as the only unknown element in  ,   , 
can be estimated consistently by the probit maximum likelihood estimation of the selection 
equation. 
The estimation for the outcome equation in the second step of the Heckman selection method 
describes the conditional expected value of   
   given the vector of independent variables    
and given that   
  =1, i.e. the expected rating for the advice received given that the person has 
actually received any advice. As the meaningful interpretation of the regression coefficients 
given by this ordered probit model can be rather complicated, to facilitate proper analysis the 
marginal effects for the probabilities for the lowest and for the highest rating outcomes are 
then calculated based on the estimates given by the ordered probit procedure for the outcome 
equation. The marginal effects for a discrete change in an independent variable are reached by 
partially differentiating the expected value of the dependent variable   
  with respect to the 
vector of dependent variables    as given by: 
   (  
    )     ⁄   (5.5) 
where   
 is the independent variable of the outcome equation,   is the vector of independent 
variables in the outcome equation and       . 
The complete Heckman selection model outlined above was estimated using the full set of 
Brand Relationship Tracker data described in Table 6 in appendix 1. The estimation results 
for the model are examined in the next chapter, which discusses the results of the empirical 
models of the thesis. However, for further insight on the model, the regression variables 
included in the estimations of the Heckman selection model are discussed in the next section. 
5.2.2 Variables 
The variables used in estimating the Heckman selection equation and their definitions are 
displayed in Table 8 in appendix 3 and some of the key summary statistics for these variables 
are displayed in Table 9 in appendix 3. To illustrate the use of estimation variables, the final 
empirical specification for the selection equation of the selection model of this study may be 
expressed as 
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                                           (5.6) 
The empirical specification for the outcome equation on the other hand may be 
expressed as: 
                                                           
                                                  
                                                   
                                                
                                                     
            (5.7) 
A notion meriting some discussion is the conventional assumption that, as noted by both 
Cameron & Trivedi (2005) as well as Verbeek (2008), the accurate identification of the 
selection equation of the Heckman model is greatly enhanced by adding at least one 
identification variable not included in the outcome equation as an independent variable in the 
selection equation, while otherwise including the same set of independent variables. In the 
setting of the Heckman selection model of this thesis the identification variable should be a 
variable that affects the probability of receiving advice, but does not affect any of the ratings 
given to the advice received. 
Both Cameron & Trivedi (2005) as well as Verbeek (2008) also further argue that such 
exclusion restrictions as adding variables to the selection equation that are not included in the 
outcome equation that are plausibly defendable are hard to make. As no potential variables for 
justifiable theory based exclusion restrictions are present in the data, the full set of variables 
included in the selection equation is also included in the outcome equation. This means that 
the identification of the Heckman selection model is facilitated through the nonlinearity of the 
functional form and the nonlinearity of the inverse mills ratio, which makes possible separate 
identification of the selection equation and the outcome equation. 
The natural main variable of interest in the Heckman selection model is the dependent 
variable in the outcome equation of the model (rating), the rating given for the advice that 
participants had received when they were purchasing their smartphone handset. As can be 
seen the (rating) variable ranges between 1 and 5 on an ordinal integer value scale. Due to 
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this dependent variable of the outcome equation being defined on an ordinal scale, an ordered 
probit procedure via the maximum likelihood method is used to estimate the outcome 
equation. The other dependent variable of the model, the one included in the selection 
equation, is the dummy variable (advice), which is either one or zero depending on whether 
the person has received advice. Due to the binary nature of (advice) the selection equation of 
the Heckman selection model is estimated with trough a probit regression where the 
probability of receiving advice is estimated via regressing (advice) with respect to the 
independent variables of the selection equation specification. 
The variables included in the estimations were either formed by utilizing the set of questions 
displayed in appendix 2, were based on the demographic properties of the respondents or 
were calculated based on the two. As can be seen from Table 9, practically all of the 
independent variables in this model are of binary nature. Apart from the variables (gender) 
and (developedmarket) a positive outcome is noted by the binary variable taking the value 1. 
I.e. the variable (age25to39) taking the value 1 implies the respondent was aged between 25 
and 39. The variable (gender) takes the value 1 if the respondent was a male and 
(developedmarket) takes the value of 1 if the respondent was living in the developed world. 
For further description the full set of independent variables utilized in the estimations and 
their definitions are presented in Table 8, and their key summary statistics are presented in 
Table 9 in appendix 3. 
5.3 Panel data models 
As the Heckman selection model presented in section 5.2 was concerned with the effects of 
word of mouth advice on an individual agent level, the focus is now turned towards the 
market level effects of word of mouth. In empirical literature, there has so far been little 
previous research done on the market share effects of word of mouth. The main reasons for 
this are most likely the elusive nature of word of mouth as a medium communication that can 
sometimes be hard to observe and the large number of factors that can be seen has effecting 
the market shares of market participants in a given market. 
To overcome these traditional challenges, the approach taken in this thesis is to utilize the 
large amount of data on word of mouth and sales available from the different smartphone 
markets across the globe and the powerful empirical methods made available by modern 
econometrics and panel data estimation methods. As previously referred, the estimation 
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methods utilized in the analysis of the panel dataset consist of the ordinary least squares 
method, the fixed effects method and the random effects method. Additionally, specification 
test for testing the validity of these model specifications are also performed. The next sections 
outline the methodology for performing these estimations and specification tests. 
5.3.1 Ordinary least squares model 
As a starting point, the first estimation method utilized for analyzing the relationship of word 
of mouth advice and operation system market shares is a standard ordinary least squares 
estimation of the relationship between period t market shares and the ratio of word of mouth 
advice in favor of an operation system present in the population at time t-1. The ordinary least 
squares method, or OLS method, is a common, standard and relatively simple method for 
estimating the unknown parameters in a linear regression model. Despite its relatively 
simplicity, OLS can still have strong explanatory power in many applications. The 
functioning of the OLS method is based on minimizing the squared distances vertical between 
the values observed in data and values predicted by a linear approximation. A simple ordinary 
least squares model for estimating the     observation of the dependent variable   can be 
expressed as: 
            (5.8) 
Where    is the  
   observation of the dependent variable,    is the  
   observation of the 
vector of independent variables and    is the unobserved error term, accounting for the 
differences between the observed responses    and the estimated values predicted by    , 
associated with the     observation. 
In the context of this thesis the utilized ordinary least squares model can be stated as: 
                             (5.9) 
where (l        ) is the logarithmic market share of operation system i at time t and 
(          ) is the share of positive word of mouth for operation system i out of the total 
amount positive word of mouth for all operation systems during the previous month at time t. 
    is the error term. To control for individual operation system specific effects, the OLS 
specification of equation (5.8) is estimated separately for each of the 4 operation systems in 
each of the 14 markets. 
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As with all panel data estimations of the thesis, the dependent variable (          ) was 
formed on the basis of a consumer survey where the respondents, were asked, if a certain 
brand had been recommended to them by someone during the last month. The responses were 
then aggregated for each operation system for each month in each of the countries to produce 
the relative share of word of mouth as a share of the total amount of word of mouth for each 
operation system during the previous month in the specific country. (          ) then 
represents the share of positive word of mouth for operation system i during the month before 
t out of the total amount of positive word of mouth during that period. As the amount of word 
of mouth and product sales are likely correlated in such a fashion that they both have an 
influence on each other, constructing the word of mouth regressors from the ratios of word of 
mouth is very intuitive and helps in controlling for the possibility of reverse causality 
affecting the empirical estimations. 
As one can see from equation (5.9) the dependent variable in the specification is the 
logarithmic market share of operation system i in country j and the sole independent variable 
is the ratio of word of mouth recommendations in favor of the operation system i in the 
previous month. The choice of using the log transformed market share as the dependent 
variable is driven by the high likeliness of a nonlinear relationship between market shares and 
word of mouth advice. As transmitted word of mouth is likely to result in more word of 
mouth being transmitted by the initial receivers, and as one person can in principle affect 
several others, it is theoretically likely for word of mouth to experience increasing returns to 
scale as captured by the log-linear functional form specification used in the panel data 
estimations. 
Obtaining the right variable specification for empirical estimations is usually not as straight 
forward as one could hope for. Cases in favor of specifications different from the 
specifications chosen for this thesis can certainly be made. To dispel any uncertainty relating 
to the validity of the chosen functional form and the chosen independent and dependent 
variables, the validity of the chosen variable specification is tested by running additional 
regressions utilizing different variable specifications. The results of these estimations are 
presented in Table 10 and Table 11 in appendix 4. Table 10 presents the ordinary least 
squares estimation results for the four operation systems estimated in the United Kingdom 
market with the four different variable specifications and Table 11 presents the fixed effects 
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estimations for the same variable specifications in the same market. The UK market was 
chosen for the testing due to its good representativeness of balanced market characteristics. 
In specification number 1 the dependent variable is the logarithmic market share of an 
operation system, (logOSMS) and the independent variable is the operation systems ratio of 
word of mouth, (WOMratio). In specification number 2 the independent variable is 
(logOSMS) and the two dependent variables are (WOMratio) and the one period lag of 
(logOSMS). In specification number 3 the dependent variable is again (logOSMS), but now 
the sole independent variable is (WOMratio) normalized by dividing it with the previous 
period’s market share. In specification number 4 the independent variable is the change in 
(logOSMS) between the current period and the previous period, and the independent variable 
is (WOMratio). 
Looking at the results in appendix 4, one immediately notices the high coefficients of 
determination in specifications 2 and 3. The high R-squared values are due to high correlation 
between this period’s and the previous period’s market shares, as in specification 2 the 
previous periods market share is used as an independent variable and in specification 3 
(WOMratio) is normalized with the previous period’s market share. The unfortunate effect of 
this is that it makes these R-squared values incomparable to the other two specifications. 
Judging by the estimation results of both the OLS estimates and the fixed effects estimates as 
a whole, it is specification 1 that seems to perform best out of out of the four different 
possible specifications in terms fitting the data and producing meaningful statistically 
significant estimates. Specification 1 is therefore chosen as the specification to be used in the 
panel data estimations. 
As the homoscedasticity of the error terms and the normality of their distribution is a major 
concern for a model specification such as that of equation (5.9), it is likely that the normal 
standard errors produced by OLS estimations are biased. To prevent this, the OLS 
specifications are estimated with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. Another major 
cause of concern regarding the results from the estimations of an ordinary least squares 
model, such as the one presented above, is the large probability that it experiences some form 
of omitted variable bias, as there is only a single independent variable in the estimated 
specification. To minimize the possibility for producing biased estimates for the effects of 
word of mouth, the above OLS specification is estimated not only separately for each of the 
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14 countries, but also estimated separately for each of the four operation system in each of the 
countries. 
Estimating separate models is however not the only method for controlling for omitted 
variable bias. Typically in the analysis of panel data, the possibility for omitted variable bias 
is controlled for by estimating a model that has time invariant individual specific effects 
included in model. Following this approach, in the next section a fixed effects model with 
operation system specific fixed effects is presented. 
5.3.2 Fixed effects model 
One of the important benefits of utilizing a panel dataset for empirical analysis is the ability of 
utilizing some of the powerful panel data estimation methods that can utilize both the spatial 
as well as temporal dimensions of the data. One of the most used panel data estimation 
methods in empirical economics literature is the fixed effects estimation method. The so 
called fixed effects models are widely utilized in empirical literature to control for any 
unobserved heterogeneity in the data and or possible omitted variable bias. In contrast to a 
standard ordinary least squares model, in a fixed effects model, also known as individual 
specific effect models, the time invariant component of the error term is allowed to be 
correlated with the dependent variables of the model. The idea behind the fixed effects 
method is that given that the unobserved heterogeneity in the data is constant over time it can 
be removed trough differencing that removes the time invariant components of the model. 
To illustrate the fixed effects estimation method, consider the following linear unobserved 
effects model: 
             . (5.10) 
The error term     in equation (5.10) can be divided into two different components as follows: 
             (5.11) 
where     is the idiosyncratic component of the error term that is uncorrelated with     and    
is the time invariant component that is allowed to correlate with    . According to Cameron & 
Trivedi (2009) it is then possible to consistently estimate   for the time varying regressors in 
    by subtracting the corresponding model for individual means: 
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 (      )   (      )  (      )  (5.12) 
which eliminates the time invariant component    of the error term    . in equation (5.10). 
The remarkable effect of this relatively simple procedure is to remove the unobserved and 
individual specific time invariant effects from the estimation results allowing the modeler to 
focus on the time variant effects on the dependent variable. The obvious drawback of the 
fixed effect method is that the model cannot include any time invariant independent variables 
as they would disappear during the differencing procedure. This restriction in the usability of 
the fixed effect model is nonetheless compensated by the increased ability for controlling for 
omitted variable bias. As in most study’s featuring non-experimental data there is a large 
possibility for some of the important covariates that have an influence the dependent variable 
not to be included in the data, the fixed effects method allows to control for the bias the non-
inclusion of these variables might have on the estimations produced by a standard ordinary 
least squares estimation. 
In the context of this thesis, the fixed effects model utilized in the estimation of operation 
system market shares can be expressed as: 
                              , (5.13) 
where (l        ) is the logarithmic market share of operation system i at time t and 
(          ) is the share of positive word of mouth for operation system i out of the total 
amount positive word of mouth for all operation systems during the previous month at time t. 
    represents the idiosyncratic component error term and    represents the time invariant 
component of the error term. The above fixed effects model is estimated with the panel 
dataset described in Table 7 in appendix 1. Estimating the fixed effects specification 
separately for all the 14 markets allows for controlling for any specific time invariant market 
effects and allows the estimated coefficients to differ from the estimates reached via 
implementing these controls via an ordinary least squares estimation method. 
As mentioned in Cameron & Trivedi (2009), the standard errors produced by fixed effects 
models are likely to be correlated and hence some correction to the default ordinary least 
squares standard errors is warranted. As the default standard errors produced by Stata 12 used 
to estimate the model are of the standard ordinary least squares type, the approach of 
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Cameron & Trivedi is followed and cluster robust standard errors with the operation system 
as the cluster variable are used in the estimations of the fixed effects model. The cluster 
robust standard errors allow the error terms to be correlated within the clusters, as in within 
the operation systems, but not between them. 
The main driver behind the utilization of the fixed effects model is to achieve higher estimator 
efficiency compared to the ordinary least squares estimations, while still simultaneously 
retaining control over variety of sources for omitted variable bias, especially considering the 
limited number of possible independent variables available in the data. The use of a fixed 
effects method for analysis can be seen as warranted by the large possibility for an omitted 
variable bias in estimates, if the individual operation system specific effects such as inherent 
product characteristics are not controlled for. As it is more than probable that there are other 
factors besides word of mouth that affect market shares, the fixed effects method is utilized to 
minimize the effects of time invariant product characteristics related to the quality of the 
smartphone product and its various determinants and the user experience that the final product 
provides. As product quality can be seen as correlating only with the time invariant 
component of the error term, controlling for the product inherent fixed effects should in this 
case produce better estimates than a standard ordinary least squares approach. 
The validity of the assumption of operation system specific time invariant fixed effects is 
tested by utilizing the popular Wald test, developed by Wald (1943) and aptly described by 
Cameron & Trivedi (2005) as the preeminent hypothesis test in microeconometrics. In 
practice, the Wald test is applied to test the validity of the fixed effects assumption via 
including dummy variables for each operation system in an ordinary least squares model, to 
account for any possible fixed effect, and testing post estimation for the joint hypothesis of all 
these dummy variables being not statistically significantly different from zero. The Wald test 
described is applied for all 14 markets studied and its results are discussed in the next chapter 
along with other estimation and specification test results. 
In search for possible further improvement on the estimations reached with the ordinary least 
squares and fixed effects approaches, in the next section another type of model with 
individual specific effects, the random effects model, is explored. 
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5.3.3 Random effects model 
In addition to the fixed effects model, another type of model that can be used to model 
individual operation system specific effects on the dependent variable model is the random 
effects model. The two different types of models with individual specific effects are relatively 
similar in their construction and estimation procedures, but the models and their 
interpretations do differ in some of their key aspects. Whereas in the fixed effects models the 
variation across the cross-sectional units is assumed to be caused by an individual specific and 
time invariant fixed effect, as described above, in the so called random effects models the 
variation is assumed to be random and hence uncorrelated with the independent variables in 
the model. 
Technically, the main difference between fixed effects models and random effects models 
relates to their assumption on the composition error term of the individual specific effects 
model in equation (5.11). As described by Cameron & Trivedi (2005) among others, whereas 
the fixed effects specification presumes    to be time invariant and correlated with    , the 
random effects specification assumes    to be an independent and identically distributed 
random variable. with    [    
 ].    is also assumed to be independent from     ,and both    
as well as     are assumed to be independent from the vector of independent variables    . The 
estimated random effects model is then easily obtained from equation (5.13) by making the 
appropriate interpretations and assumptions on the structure of the error terms. 
One of the benefits for the random effects specification when compared to the fixed effects 
specification is that the random effects specification allows for time invariant independent 
variables, such as gender, to be used as independent variables as they are not removed by 
differencing. On the other hand, fixed effects models are less prone to experience omitted 
variable bias than random effects specifications and, according to Cameron & Trivedi (2005), 
fixed effects model also have the attraction of allowing for the establishment of causation 
under weaker assumptions than the random effects model. The choice between a fixed or a 
random effects specification can often be tricky, but fortunately ways to test for the right 
specification have been developed. 
The most commonly utilized test for testing the validity of the random effects specification, 
the Hausman test, was developed by Hausman (1978) and is easily applicable for most panel 
data. As is done in the context of this thesis, the test can be applied by first separately 
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estimating the model with fixed effects and then with random effects and then utilizing the 
Hausman specification test to test for the appropriateness of the random effects specification. 
The null hypothesis of the the Hausman test is that the individual specific effects are 
uncorrelated with the independent variables of the model, corresponding with the random 
effects specification. 
According to Cameron & Trivedi (2009), under the null hypothesis that the individual specific 
effects are random, the two estimators should be similar due to the consistency of both 
estimators. If this is the case, according to Cameron & Trivedi the random effects 
specification should be favored as in the case of a fixed effects specification the use of only 
within variation leads to less efficient estimates than with a random effects specification. On 
the other hand if the two estimators substantially differ the random effects estimator is 
inconsistent and a fixed effects specification should be used. Consequently a Hausman test 
statistic large enough for the appropriate confidence level, will lead to the rejection of the null 
hypothesis and to the fixed effects model to be favored over a random effects specification. 
Where the Hausman test can be used to differentiate between the fixed effects and the random 
effects model, it does not give information regarding the validity of the random effects model 
when compared to the simple ordinary least squares estimator. Luckily again, a method for 
differentiating between the random effects specification and a simple OLS model has been 
proposed by Breusch & Pagan (1980) and is called the Breusch Pagan Lagrange multiplier 
test. The Lagrange multiplier test can be used to test for whether there is variance across 
entities that would imply a panel effect in the data and strongly favor a random effects 
specification over OLS. The null hypothesis of the test is that there is no significant difference 
across units and no heteroskedasticity is present. The null hypothesis is then rejected if the 
test statistic is large enough for the appropriate confidence level. Rejection of the null 
hypothesis would then lead to the conclusion that the variance across units is significant and a 
random effects specification should be favored over the ordinary least squares model, and 
vice versa. 
To test for the right empirical specification for the analysis of the effects of word of mouth on 
market shares both the Hausman test and the Breusch Pagan Lagrange multiplier test are 
performed for each of the 14 markets under analysis. As described, the Hausman test is 
performed after estimating both the fixed effects and random effects specifications and the 
Breusch Pagan test is performed after the estimation of the random effects specification. 
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Along with other estimation results, the results of the specification tests are discussed in the 
next chapter, which focuses on the results of the empirical analysis performed under the 
framework laid out in this chapter. 
6. Empirical results 
This chapter presents the empirical findings of the thesis and relates them to the theoretical 
framework laid out in the preceding chapters, as well as contrasts the findings with those of 
previous empirical research. The chapter begins by a presentation of the estimation results for 
the Heckman selection model presented in chapter 5.2. The estimation results for the 
Heckman selection model and its marginal effects are presented and discussed. After the 
Heckman selection model the focus of this chapter will turn to presenting and discussing the 
results of the panel data analysis and the findings of the three empirical models, the ordinary 
least squares model, the fixed effects model and the random effects model. To determine the 
performance of the panel data model specifications, the results from the three different model 
specification tests are also analyzed. As the estimation results are presented their statistical, as 
well as practical, significance is highlighted and their theoretical, as well as practical, 
implications are discussed. 
6.1 Estimation results for the Heckman selection model 
The estimation results for the outcome equation of the Heckman selection model are 
presented in Table 1, while the results for the selection equation can be found in Table 12 in 
appendix 5. Looking at the estimation results in Table 1 one immediately notices that all 
independent variable coefficients are found to be significant at the 1 percent significance 
level, except the variable 55plus which is found to be significant at the 5 percent significance 
level. Of great interest is of course the significance of the coefficient estimated for the inverse 
mills ratio, which is estimated to be significant at the one percent significance level. The 
negative and highly significant inverse mills ratio signals that a selection bias is apparent in 
the data and estimating the model without correcting for the selection bias would have 
produced downwardly biased estimates. Indeed, all of the independent variable coefficients 
estimated in the selection equation are significant at 1 percent significance level showing 
further evidence for selection bias in the data warranting the use of the Heckman selection 
model procedure. 
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Table 1. Heckman outcome equation estimates 
active 0.0870*** 0.0188
children 0.264*** 0.0131
friends 0.0317*** 0.0116
colleagues 0.0483*** 0.0113
parents 0.0516*** 0.0129
spouse 0.137*** 0.0106
siblingsandcousins 0.0585*** 0.0117
gender 0.423*** 0.0859
developedmarket 1.214*** 0.149
age25to39 0.142*** 0.0336
age40to54 0.204*** 0.0695
age55plus 0.204** 0.0858
coreconsumer 0.249*** 0.0325
via_face2face 0.299*** 0.0161
via_phone 0.128*** 0.0139
via_some 0.193*** 0.0156
via_email 0.368*** 0.0216
via_instmes -0.100*** 0.0174
invmills -3.815*** 0.802
Number of observations
Log likelihood
Chi2
Prob > chi2
Pseudo R2 0.0506
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Model statistics
42407
-58844.993
Standard errorCoefficientIndependent variable
6267.64
0
 
The control group, and hence the base case, for the estimated coefficients is represented by a 
consumer who is a female, aged between 16 and 24, lives in the developing world and is not 
considered to be a “core consumer”. The control group for the advice sources in terms of 
people is represented by advice classified in the data as having been received from “other 
person” and the control group in terms of mediums is represented by advice classified in the 
data as being received through “other medium”. 
As explained in the previous chapter when the Heckman selection model was presented, the 
practical interpretation of the coefficients produced by estimating the ordered probit model 
can be rather complicated. For greater clarity and to facilitate the analysis of the results, the 
marginal effects of changes in the independent variables of the outcome equation on the 
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probabilities of the highest and the lowest rating outcome, and their standard deviations, were 
calculated and are presented in Table 2. As expected, the estimated marginal effects also turn 
out to be highly significant. The estimated marginal effects presented in Table 2 represent the 
marginal effect of a discrete change in the value of an independent variable to the probability 
of a certain rating to be given for the experience of receiving advice on their smartphone 
purchase by the person receiving advice. The last column of Table 2 reports the estimated 
partial effects on the probability of receiving advice. 
Table 2. Estimated marginal effects in the Heckman model and their standard deviations 
Rating 1 Rating 5 Rating 1 Rating 5
active -0.00124*** 0.0186*** 0.000284 0.00394
children -0.00304*** 0.0618*** 0.000205 0.00331
friends -0.000435*** 0.00686*** 0.000162 0.0025
colleagues -0.000652*** 0.0105*** 0.000155 0.00247
parents -0.000680*** 0.0114*** 0.000168 0.00288
spouse -0.00186*** 0.0298*** 0.000172 0.00231
siblingsandcousins -0.000778*** 0.0128*** 0.000158 0.0026
gender -0.00635*** 0.0901*** 0.0015 0.0179 -0.0736***
developedmarket -0.0106*** 0.344*** 0.00129 0.0493 -0.1274***
age25to39 -0.00189*** 0.0312*** 0.000451 0.00747 -0.0278***
age40to54 -0.00239*** 0.0474*** 0.00071 0.0172 -0.0597***
age55plus -0.00223*** 0.0486** 0.000753 0.0222 -0.0724***
coreconsumer -0.00264*** 0.0601*** 0.0003 0.00864 0.0248***
via_face2face -0.00437*** 0.0639*** 0.000338 0.00339
via_phone -0.00159*** 0.0291*** 0.000178 0.00327
via_some -0.00224*** 0.0449*** 0.000194 0.00388
via_email -0.00341*** 0.0939*** 0.000226 0.00631
via_instmes 0.00151*** -0.0210*** 0.000297 0.00347
invmills 0.0518*** -0.831*** 0.0112 0.175
Partial effect 
on P(advice)
Standard deviationMarginal effect on rating
Variable
 (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)  
Interpreting the results of the calculated partial effects, all partial effects for the dependent 
variables in the selection equation are all highly significant and, apart from the variable 
(coreconsumer), strictly negative, implying these variables having a negative effect on the 
probability of receiving advice. The variable (coreconsumer), which is estimated to have a 
positive partial effect, is a dummy variable for the consumer being defined as a core consumer 
on the basis of his or her socio-demographic attributes. In the current context the core 
consumer classification can be seen as a valid proxy for the consumer being a technological 
forerunner influential in new technology diffusion. It is only natural that such consumers are 
probable to exert more cognitive resources and to consume more word of mouth when making 
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technology related purchase decision, resulting in a higher ex ante probability of them having 
received advice. 
In terms of the estimated marginal effects on ratings, while all of the estimated marginal 
effects are significant at least at the 5 percent significance level and hence can be considered 
highly significant, the estimation results are also much in line with what one could expect 
based on theory economic theory. Unsurprisingly, actively seeking word of mouth advice 
increases the probability of the advice being given the highest rating by 1.9 percentage points 
and decreases the probability of it being given the lowest rating by 0.1 percentage points. The 
results is unsurprising as intuitively active search for word of mouth implies a higher 
cognitive invest from the individual, making him or her inclined to rate the result of their 
search favorably to enhance the value of their effort in the form of invested time and 
recourses. 
In terms of sources for word of mouth and in terms of people, as can be seen from Table 2, by 
far the biggest marginal effect for an increase in the probability of a high rating is found to be 
for advice received from children, which was estimated to increase the probability of the 
advice being rated as five by 6.2 percentage points when compared to the control group. 
Similarly, the advice received from children is also the least probable to receive the poorest 
rating when compared to the control group. After children the second highest marginal effect 
for a positive rating is found for advice received from one’s spouse, which is estimated to 
increase the probability of the highest rating by 3 percentage points. Friends, colleagues, 
parents and siblings as well as cousins all have relatively smaller marginal effects similar to 
each other. 
These results for the Heckman selection model imply that the ratings given are strongly 
correlated with closeness of the relationship of the advisor and the receiver of the advice. A 
stronger social tie between the two implicates a higher rating for the advice by the receiver. 
This result, while somewhat contradicting the findings of Steffes & Burgee (2009), who 
found that a stronger social tie does not necessarily implicate a higher rating for advice, can 
be considered rather intuitive. The result is also in line with the results of Brown & Reingen 
(1987), who found that strong ties were perceived as more influential, and the traditional 
theoretical view of the people closest to us having the most influence over us. 
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Considering the demographic variables that were included in both the selection equation and 
the outcome equation, the biggest positive effect on probability for the highest rating is 
estimated for the consumer living in a developed market, which increases the probability for 
the highest rating by 31.2 percentage points. The possible reasons for this might be related to 
either cultural differences or to consumers in developed countries on average purchasing more 
expensive smartphones than consumers in developing countries and thus experiencing the 
device offering a higher value better matching their expectations, which in turn results in 
relatively higher ratings. The fact that the marginal effect of the consumer being a core 
consumer, and thus a so called technological forerunner, is high as well also speaks in favor 
of this interpretation. 
Other notable results related to the demographic variables is also that the probability of rating 
advice highly seems to increase with age as all age groups have a positive marginal effect that 
increases with the age groups. Also, males were estimated to being more prone towards 
giving higher ratings as they are 9 percentage points more likely than women to rate the 
advice they receive with the highest rating. Both results the probability for a high rating 
increasing with age and males more probably giving higher ratings than females can be seen 
stemming from the same underlying product knowledge related factor. 
As younger people tend to be more technologically savvy then the old, and men tend to be 
more interested in technology than women, the underlying factor behind these results might 
be greater technological knowledge driving the word of mouth consumption process of these 
individuals, resulting in higher ratings than those given by people with less technological 
knowledge. A similar view is supported by the fact that advice received from children was 
estimated to be over 5 percentage points more likely to be given the highest rating than the 
advice from parents. As younger generations in general possess a better technological 
knowledge than older generations, this also speaks in favor of underlying product knowledge 
being one of the drivers behind valuing advice more highly. 
In terms of the medium of transmission for word of mouth, the highest probability for 
receiving the highest rating when compared to the control group is estimated for advice 
received through email followed by advice received as traditional face to face advice and 
advice received through social media. While estimated as being statistically significant at the 
1 percent significance level, the robustness of the result of advice received via email having 
the highest probability of receiving the highest rating is somewhat debatable. The empirical 
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interpretation could be that people only receive advice via email form people that they have 
strong social ties to, resulting in such a high estimate. On the other hand, the proportion of 
consumers in the data who had received advice through email was relatively low, which 
questions the validity of generalizing the result to hold for larger populations. 
Interestingly receiving advice through instant messaging was estimated to have a negative 
effect on the probability of a high rating and a positive effect on the probability of a low 
rating. As with advice received through email, the proportion of consumers who had received 
advice through instant messaging was rather low, and the possible reasons for such an 
unintuitive result could relate to the fact that classification of instant messaging can cover not 
only messages between persons known to each other, but also chats between complete 
strangers. If the effect of the social tie between the advice giver and receiver is as strong as 
estimated, the social tie effect can dominate the channel effect resulting in advice received 
from persons with whom the receiver has weak social ties with as poor disregarding the 
channel. 
In general the estimation results for the effects of the channel that the word of mouth is 
transmitted with seem to reflect the results estimated for the human sources of word of mouth. 
In both cases closeness of social tie and the degree of human interaction associated with the 
advice seem to be positively correlated with the ratings given to advice. As written reviews 
can be perceived as emulating traditional word of mouth more closely than simple ordinal 
ratings, the results of this thesis are therefore similar to those found by Chevalier & Mayzlin 
(2006), who found that written reviews outperformed ordinal ratings in explanatory power 
when determining sales figures. 
The results of the Heckman selection model suggest that the closer the social tie and bigger 
the resemblance of the medium of transmission to traditional face to face transmission, the 
higher the probability of the advice being rated highly. The implications of these results to 
social learning outcomes in the context of the smartphone market will be examined in the next 
sections, as the panel data estimation results for the effects of word of mouth on market shares 
are discussed. 
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6.2 Estimation results for the ordinary least squares model 
The estimation results for the ordinary least squares model are presented in Table 3. As can be 
seen, the ordinary least squares specification was first estimated jointly for all operation 
systems in each of the 14 markets and then estimated separately for each operation system in 
each country. Table 13 in appendix 6 presents the bivariate correlations between the 
dependent variable logistic market share and the independent variable word of mouth ratio for 
each operation systems in each of the 14 markets. As can be seen from Table 13, the 
correlation coefficients vary greatly across countries and across operation systems. In some 
countries very high positive correlations are found, while in others the observed correlation is 
even found to be negative. The highest positive correlations are in most markets found for the 
BlackBerry operation system. Although there is large variance in the magnitude and direction 
of the correlations implied by the bivariate correlation coefficients, in general there is a strong 
message of a tight relationship between the two variables. 
Moving from the bivariate correlations to the estimation results from the ordinary least 
squares model, the results of the OLS estimations are presented in Table 3. A simple ordinary 
least squares estimation estimated jointly for all operation systems finds word of mouth to 
have a positive effect on market share in all markets apart from Brazil and India, where the 
coefficient for (WOMratio) is for some reason estimated to be negative. The highest effect for 
word of mouth is estimated for Indonesia, where an increase of one percentage point in the 
positive word of mouth ratio is estimated to increase an operation systems market share by 
over 8.6 percent. In 9 out of the 14 markets a one percentage point increase in an operation 
systems share of word of mouth is estimated to increase its market share by more than 3 
percent. 
Interestingly, in contradiction to most markets, in the three continental Europe markets of 
France, Germany and Italy the coefficient for word of mouth was estimated to be only 1.1, 2 
and 1.3 respectively, likely indicating some region specific structural market characteristics 
that lessen the impact of word of mouth. When examining the results, it needs to however be 
noted that in terms of the magnitude of the effect of word of mouth on market shares, these 
results need to be taken with a grain of salt as in the estimations performed jointly for all 
operation systems there is a large possibility for individual operation system specific effects 
biasing the estimation results. Furthermore, while most of the coefficients estimated for word 
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of mouth are significant at the 1 percent significance level, for some markets the R-squared 
values reported for each of the OLS regressions performed without discriminating between 
the operation systems are rather poor. It is likely that bundling up the four operation systems 
together hides much of the inherent variation between them. 
Table 3. Ordinary least squares estimates 
Country Australia Brazil China France Germany India Indonesia Italy Mexico Nigeria Russia Saudi Arabia UK USA
Dependent variable logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS
WOMratio 3.404*** -0.0925 3.448*** 1.147* 2.005*** -4.838* 8.628*** 1.314** 6.214*** 3.743*** 5.116*** 3.804*** 3.051*** 6.872***
(0.465) (0.938) (0.953) (0.659) (0.498) (2.683) (1.079) (0.549) (1.936) (0.317) (1.076) (1.144) (0.806) (0.634)
Constant -3.142*** -2.405*** -4.473*** -2.236*** -2.769*** -1.163 -4.679*** -2.352*** -3.955*** -3.679*** -4.310*** -3.409*** -2.613*** -4.119***
(0.269) (0.369) (0.557) (0.296) (0.284) (0.781) (0.343) (0.27) (0.681) (0.236) (0.483) (0.484) (0.336) (0.281)
Observations 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72
R-squared 0.221 0 0.05 0.029 0.077 0.059 0.312 0.036 0.135 0.46 0.127 0.119 0.146 0.405
Country Australia Brazil China France Germany India Indonesia Italy Mexico Nigeria Russia Saudi Arabia UK USA
Dependent variable logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS
WOMratio -4.013 0.252 -0.117 -0.181 -0.177 0.145 -2.084* 0.368 2.460* 0.911 -0.0953 6.253** 0.783 1.187
(2.65) (0.285) (0.454) (1.381) (0.731) (0.995) (0.998) (0.297) (1.253) (2.392) (0.0992) (2.169) (1.266) (0.94)
Constant 0.00349 -0.214*** -0.0968 -0.423** -0.314*** -0.305 -0.536** -0.435*** -0.825*** -1.531*** -0.160*** -1.315*** -0.855*** -0.865***
(0.335) (0.0613) (0.0668) (0.17) (0.0944) (0.188) (0.204) (0.0451) (0.219) (0.148) (0.0229) (0.251) (0.149) (0.178)
Observations 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
R-squared 0.136 0.027 0.008 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.158 0.06 0.168 0.015 0.024 0.191 0.021 0.088
Country Australia Brazil China France Germany India Indonesia Italy Mexico Nigeria Russia Saudi Arabia UK USA
Dependent variable logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS
WOMratio 18.98*** 10.32*** 15.86 6.974*** 3.009 13.38*** 0.0254 6.910*** 6.827*** 0.244 3.549 -0.404 5.174*** 13.64***
(3.168) (3.421) (9.189) (2.138) (2.474) (3.763) (0.868) (1.426) (1.038) (0.321) (3.319) (1.052) (1.44) (2.671)
Constant -6.869*** -5.822*** -10.29*** -3.942*** -3.945*** -5.887*** -0.559 -4.282*** -4.048*** -0.556* -7.275*** -0.894** -3.234*** -6.388***
(0.539) (0.819) (1.560) (0.595) (0.41) (1.109) (0.363) (0.282) (0.325) (0.284) (0.477) (0.388) (0.434) (0.517)
Observations 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
R-squared 0.493 0.259 0.137 0.434 0.08 0.375 0 0.505 0.629 0.043 0.031 0.004 0.355 0.492
Country Australia Brazil China France Germany India Indonesia Italy Mexico Nigeria Russia Saudi Arabia UK USA
Dependent variable logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS
WOMratio 5.264 0.802 -4.384 7.062* -4.489** 21.06*** 12.59** 3.881 13.97 0.156 7.140* -3.96 5.66 2.194
(4.872) (3.048) (5.763) (3.766) (2.078) (5.961) (5.477) (7.466) (18.56) (1.534) (3.734) (5.066) (4.733) (3.584)
Constant -4.003*** -3.528*** -3.696*** -4.306*** -3.109*** -7.268*** -5.786*** -3.610*** -6.851*** -4.865*** -3.611*** -5.585*** -4.374*** -4.393***
(0.437) (0.415) (0.747) (0.421) (0.312) (1.181) (0.564) (0.968) (2.061) (0.219) (0.451) (0.413) (0.532) (0.377)
Observations 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
R-squared 0.039 0.004 0.038 0.12 0.28 0.42 0.171 0.017 0.026 0 0.204 0.032 0.04 0.016
Country Australia Brazil China France Germany India Indonesia Italy Mexico Nigeria Russia Saudi Arabia UK USA
Dependent variable logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS
WOMratio -1.453 -2.480** 0.548 -0.855 0.0197 4.598 -1.094** -1.053 -2.785 1.525* -0.323 1.227** 1.900*** 1.967***
(1.527) (1.081) (2.025) (1.211) (0.92) (7.546) (0.485) (0.794) (2.625) (0.773) (0.887) (0.531) (0.648) (0.657)
Constant -0.183 -1.693*** -2.744** -1.169* -1.525** -5.285* -3.662*** -1.052** -1.17 -4.446*** -2.160*** -2.859*** -2.104*** -1.908***
(0.957) (0.475) (1.133) (0.619) (0.557) (2.552) (0.146) (0.415) (0.936) (0.148) (0.455) (0.25) )(0.3 (0.339)
Observations 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
R-squared 0.058 0.175 0.003 0.027 0 0.03 0.067 0.063 0.072 0.19 0.004 0.092 0.233 0.351
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1Robust standard errors in parentheses
Ordinary least squares estimations for all operation systems
Ordinary least squares estimations for Android
Ordinary least squares estimations for BlackBerry
Ordinary least squares estimations for Windows Phone
Ordinary least squares estimations for iOS
 
To further investigate the effects of word of mouth on market shares, the results for the 
ordinary least squares estimations performed separately for each operation system in each of 
the markets are presented in Table 3 below the estimates for the all operation systems 
combined. The separate estimations for each operation system bring out some of the variation 
between them as the estimated coefficients for (WOMratio) experience huge variations across 
different operation systems and different markets. For Android the OLS estimator seems to 
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perform poorly as the estimated coefficients for are found to be statistically significant at least 
at the 10 percent significance level only in two of the 14 markets and the estimated 
coefficients of determination, R-squared values, are rather low. 
On the other hand, for BlackBerry the simple OLS estimator seems to perform much better in 
explaining the variance in market shares. The estimated coefficients for (WOMratio) for 
BlackBerry are found to be significant at the 1 percent significance level for 8 out of the 14 
markets, with the coefficients of determination for these markets attaining decent values. 
Between Android and Blackberry, the two ends of the estimation results spectrum, are iOS 
and Windows Phone for which both the estimation results in terms of coefficients estimated 
for (WOMratio) and the reported regression R-squared values vary greatly between markets. 
While in some markets the coefficient for word of mouth is estimated to be even negative, 
though usually not at any reasonable level of statistical significance, the highest coefficient 
for word of mouth in these operation system specific OLS estimations is estimated for 
Windows Phone in India, where a one percentage point increase in Windows Phone’s word of 
mouth ratio is estimated to increase its market share by 21 percent. Very high coefficient 
estimates are also found for BlackBerry in many markets with, e.g. in Australia a one 
percentage point increase in BlackBerry’s word of mouth share is estimated to increase its 
market share by almost 19 percent. Similarly high and statistically significant at the 1 percent 
significance level coefficients for (WOMratio) are also estimated for BlackBerry in many of 
the markets. 
The general Implication of the results for the ordinary least squares estimations is very similar 
to what can be reached from examining the correlation coefficients presented earlier. 
Correlation and in some cases even causality of varying strength between word of mouth and 
market shares is implied by the results. In some markets and for some operation systems such 
as BlackBerry, and to an extent iOS, the simple OLS estimator seems to perform well in 
linking word of mouth and market shares. For some operation systems in some of the markets 
a valid case for positive word of mouth having a positive effect on market shares can be 
made. Yet, in some cases the OLS estimation results leave a lot to be desired in terms of 
robustness and explanatory power of the model and results. To further examine the 
relationship between word of mouth and market shares, the results for the estimated fixed 
effects model are presented in the next section. 
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6.3 Estimation results for the fixed effects model 
The estimation results for the fixed effects model are presented in Table 4. As one can see, the 
results for the fixed effects model are rather different from the results of the similar ordinary 
least squares model estimations including all of the operation systems. The coefficient for 
word of mouth is found to be significant only in two of the fourteen markets. In India 
(WOMratio) is found to be significant at one percent significance level and in the United 
Kingdom (WOMratio) is found to significant at the 5 percent significance level What is 
notable in the estimation results for India is the size of the estimated coefficient. According to 
the estimation results, a one percentage point increase in the relative word of mouth share for 
an operation system in India will result in an increase of 10.5 percent increase in its market 
share. In the UK on the other hand, a one percentage point increase in (WOMratio) is 
estimated to increase an operation systems market share by 3.6 percent. 
Table 4. Fixed effects model estimates 
Country WOMratio Constant Observations R-squared
Australia 2.013 (3.823) -2.794* (0.956) 72 0.017
Brazil 2.819 (3.581) -3.133** (0.895) 72 0.045
China 1.869 (3.12) -4.079** (0.78) 72 0.008
France 2.494 (2.531) -2.572** (0.633) 72 0.066
Germany -0.245 (1.449) -2.207*** (0.362) 72 0.001
India 10.53*** (2.744) -5.005*** (0.69) 72 0.18
Indonesia 1.707 (2.902) -2.949** (0.725) 72 0.015
Italy 1.67 (2.231) -2.441** (0.558) 72 0.02
Mexico 3.918 (3.057) -3.381** (0.764) 72 0.021
Nigeria 0.652 (0.393) -2.906*** (0.0983) 72 0.017
Russia 0.895 (1.02) -3.255*** (0.255) 72 0.008
Saudi Arabia 0.508 (0.898) -2.585*** (0.224) 72 0.003
UK 3.634** (1.128) -2.758*** (0.282) 72 0.057
USA 4.453 (2.882) -3.514** (0.721) 72 0.163
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
The results for the fixed effects model are rather interesting in the sense that, while the 
coefficient for word of mouth is estimated to be significant in only two out of the fourteen 
markets, in the two markets where (WOMratio) is estimated to be significant it is not only 
significant but also rather large. Also very interestingly, although not statistically significant, 
the estimated coefficient for (WOMratio) in Germany is negative even after accounting the 
individual operation system specific effects. Low values for the coefficients of determination 
are typical for panel data models and fixed effects estimations as in such models the 
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explanatory power of the intercepts are not included in the coefficients. Nevertheless, the R-
squared values reported in Table 4 indicate poor fit for the fixed effects model. In the face of 
such mixed and unintuitive results validity of the model specification must hence be analyzed 
and further inspected. 
To compare the fixed effects model and the ordinary least squares model and to test whether 
there are operation system specific fixed effects in the data the previously introduced Wald 
test for the joint hypothesis of all operation system dummies being zero. The results of the 
Wald tests are reported in Table 14 in appendix 7. As one can see from the Wald test results 
reported in Table 14, the F-statistic values greatly exceed the commonly used critical values 
for the rejection of the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis of dummy variable coefficients 
being zero is thus firmly rejected in all markets, implying the presence of operation system 
specific effects. 
The joint implications of the results of the fixed effects model and the results of the Wald test 
are that, though according to the Wald test there are definitely operation system specific 
effects inherent in the data, these effects might not be properly captured by the ordinary least 
squares method. Due to the relatively poor explanatory power of the fixed effects model a 
random effects specification was also estimated. To see, if the estimated random effects 
specification performs better than the fixed effects specification in capturing the variance in 
market shares caused by word of mouth, the results of the random effects model are presented 
in the next section. 
6.4 Estimation results for the random effects model 
The estimation results for the random effects model presented in Table 5 are somewhat 
similar to the estimation results from the fixed effects model and most of the estimated 
coefficients are close to those produced by the fixed effects estimations. While the estimated 
(WOMratio) coefficient in the United Kingdom is still significant at the 1 percent significance 
level, in India the coefficient is now significant only at the 10 percent significance level. In 
Nigeria the coefficient for (WOMratio) was not statistically significant in the fixed effects 
estimation, but in the random effects estimation it is now estimated to be significant at the 5 
percent significance level. 
 74 
 
As can be seen from Table 5, the estimation results from the random effects specification are 
mixed. Even though positive and significant at the 1 percent significance level in the OLS 
estimation, the estimated coefficient for (WOMratio) in Germany is still negative, albeit not 
statistically significant, just as in the fixed effects model. In terms of magnitudes of the effects 
of word of mouth, the coefficients estimated for UK and India are close those estimated with 
the fixed effects specification. 
Table 5. Random effects model estimates 
Country WOMratio Constant Observations
Australia 2.243 (3.359) -2.852* (1.496) 72
Brazil 2.718 (3.549) -3.107** (1.326) 72
China 1.957 (3.108) -4.101* (2.227) 72
France 2.414 (2.461) -2.553** (1.01) 72
Germany -0.173 (1.4) -2.225*** (0.863) 72
India 9.722* (5.793) -4.803** (2.032) 72
Indonesia 1.96 (3.008) -3.012** (1.499) 72
Italy 1.638 (2.108) -2.432** (0.99) 72
Mexico 4.144 (3.2) -3.437** (1.461) 72
Nigeria 0.811** (0.341) -2.946*** (1.051) 72
Russia 0.964 (1.051) -3.272** (1.553) 72
Saudi Arabia 0.592 (0.753) -2.606** (1.068) 72
UK 3.561*** (1.324) -2.740*** (0.885) 72
USA 4.57 (2.79) -3.543*** (1.296) 72
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
For Nigeria the random effects estimation estimates the coefficient for (WOMratio) to be 
rather low at 0.8. This result coupled with the random effects estimation results for India 
would implies that word of mouth is almost twelve times as effective in affecting market 
shares in India as it is in Nigeria, as a one percentage point increase in (WOMratio) is 
estimated to increase an operation systems market share 0.8 percent in Nigeria and 9.7 percent 
in India. The validity of this result naturally requires some reservations as such a difference 
between markets in the effects of word of mouth can be seen as rather large. A possible 
explanation for the relatively high coefficient estimates for India might relate to the country’s 
culture focusing on close personal ties, which as previously shown can greatly increase the 
effectiveness of word of mouth. 
What is also interesting across the estimation results for all three different panel data 
estimation methods is the robustness of the estimated market share increasing effects of 
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positive word of mouth in the United Kingdom market. The coefficient for (WOMratio) is 
estimated to be positive and significant at the 1 percent significance level all of the three panel 
data models including the full group of operation systems. The probable reason for such 
robust estimates is the balanced nature of the high level competition in the UK market 
producing variance in market shares facilitating more precise and robust estimates. 
As the estimates produced by the random effects estimations are very close to those produced 
by the fixed effects estimations, the validity of the random effects specification compared to 
the fixed effects specification is tested via the Hausman test introduced in the previous 
chapter. The results of the Hausman test are reported in Table 15 in appendix 7. As can be 
seen from the results, the null hypothesis of the individual specific effects being uncorrelated 
with (WOMratio), the independent variable of the model, is not rejected in any of the 14 
markets at any of the commonly used critical values. The implication of this result is that the 
random effects estimator is consistent and in this case should be favored over the fixed effects 
estimator as argued by Cameron & Trivedi (2009). 
Although superior to the fixed effects specification according to the Hausman test results, the 
explanatory power of the random effects specification seems to still leave a lot to be desired. 
The appropriateness of the random effects specification is therefore compared also to the 
ordinary least squares specification with the previously introduced Breusch Pagan Lagrange 
multiplier test. The results for the Breusch Pagan Lagrange multiplier test are reported in 
Table 16 in appendix 7. The test results indicate that the null hypothesis of the variance 
between entities being zero and no panel effect being present in the data is firmly rejected in 
all markets for all commonly used significance levels. The results therefore indicate there to 
be significant variance across entities in the data, implying the presence of individual 
operation system specific panel effect. Combining the results of the Hausman test and the 
Breusch Pagan Lagrange multiplier test leads to the conclusion of the data experiencing 
individual operation system specific effects of the random effects type. 
As a whole, the estimation results for the panel data estimations presented above signal mixed 
results. The random effects specification seems to perform best out of the three different 
model specifications considered, but the results are it produces are not conclusive. At the 
market level there seems to be a strong implication of correlation between word of mouth and 
market shares, but in the light of the current data establishing robust causality between the 
two has proven to be far more difficult In terms of whether word of mouth causes herd 
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behavior in the sense that positive word of mouth leads to consumers herding towards a 
certain brand in their consumption choices is not yet fully clear in the light of the current data. 
Some of the results, such as those found for the UK market, are however suggestive of such 
an outcome being a valid possibility. The key drivers of the empirical findings presented in 
this chapter as well as their broader implications are discussed more profoundly in the next 
chapter, which presents the main conclusions to be drawn from the thesis. 
7. Conclusions 
The purpose of this thesis was to examine the effects of word of mouth facilitated social 
learning in the context of the smartphone markets. Although the phenomenon of social 
learning has been recognized long ago, the exact mechanism how social learning facilitates 
information aggregation and what are the factors that contribute favorably to extreme learning 
outcomes are not yet clear. After reviewing the relevant body of social learning literature, the 
effects and effectiveness of word of mouth were examined in the context of the smartphone 
market, on an individual level and at a market wide level. This chapter concludes the findings 
of the thesis, discusses its limitations and explores its implications for further research in the 
field. 
7.1. Findings 
The main findings of this thesis can be divided between the results from the individual level 
analysis and the results of the market level analysis. At the individual level, the effectiveness 
of word of mouth is found to correlate closely with strength of the social tie between the 
advisor and the receiver of the advice. This view is further supported by the results of how the 
medium of advice transmission effects the valuation of word of mouth advice, as advice 
received via more personal type mediums was rated more highly than advice received via 
impersonal mediums. A large rating increasing effect was also found for the consumer 
participating in active search for advice, most likely reflecting the rating increasing effect of 
cognitive resource investment. 
Other factors, such as demographic factors, seem to have an influence as well with most 
notably consumers living in the developed word to be much more probable to rate the advice 
they receive highly when compared to consumers living in the developing world. The possible 
reasons for this is might well be related to cultural differences or hte the relatively higher 
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product quality of the smartphones purchased by developed country consumers when 
compared to their developing country counterparts. Besides place of residency, results 
regarding the effects of other demographic factors such as age and gender seem to reflect the 
underlying technological proficiency of the consumer, as being a male, being young and 
being a technological forerunner all increased the probability of rating received advice highly 
when making a decision on a smartphone purchase. 
At the market wide level the main interest of this thesis was to study the effects of word of 
mouth on smartphone operation system market shares and to determine whether word of 
mouth advice could result in social learning facilitated herd behavior resulting in consumers 
herding towards a particular brand in their consumption decisions. While the empirical results 
suggest that there is definitely a strong correlation between the two, the strength of the 
relationship and the existence and strength of causality between word of mouth and market 
shares is not yet fully clear. The results suggest that in some markets positive word of mouth 
does have a positive effect on an operation system’s market share. That being said, the 
estimation results for some of the markets are a lot less conclusive. What is clear is that the 
results imply there to be large differences between markets and operation systems in word of 
mouth’s effects on market shares. 
Considering the market share effects of word of mouth, the results of this thesis can be 
summarized as implying positive word of mouth having a positive effect on a product’s 
market share, but due to mostly data related limitations the exact isolation and quantification 
of this effect still requires further research. The somewhat robust results for word of mouth 
driving market shares the United Kingdom market are especially interesting. In the UK 
positive word of mouth is estimated to have a positive and a highly significant effect on 
market shares with all three panel data estimation methods. The United Kingdom market is an 
important example in the sense that the four players each have a significant share of the 
market, which is not the case in all markets. Some players having stable dominating position 
in some of the markets naturally brings some challenges to modeling market share changes 
due to their stabile nature. 
Based on the results of the thesis’ empirical analysis it can be seen as plausible that word of 
mouth does affect market shares, at least to a degree. This market share effects is however 
highly dependent on the multiple market related factors such as market characteristics and 
factors influencing the social learning process. Additionally, based on the empirical analysis it 
 78 
 
can be seen as possible for word of mouth to result in social learning via aggregation of 
information. Herd behavior in consumption choices resulting in consumers herding towards a 
particular brand is hence a valid possible market outcome. Nevertheless, as with all social 
learning situations, the end result is dependent on numerous market and situation specific 
factors. The results of this thesis are encouraging for linking word of mouth with sales and 
ultimately with company performance, but more specific future research on the subject will 
hopefully help in isolating the effects. 
7.2. Limitations 
When examining the results of this thesis and generalizing them into a broader context, there 
are several provisions and limitations to take into account. Some the limitations of this thesis 
are obvious, whereas some of them merit further inspection. As with any empirical study 
utilizing empirical data, the nature and structure of the data available bring bounds on the 
empirical analysis. As the Brand Relationship Tracker data utilized for empirical analysis was 
collected via survey methods, the question of how well the recorded responses actually reflect 
the true opinions and valuations of subjects. The estimations performed with the Heckman 
selection model were rather simple in terms of identifying the sources and effects of word of 
mouth. Future research with a more diverse and flexible dataset could bring more light to the 
different factors determining the effectiveness of word of mouth, especially in terms of 
channel effects for technology facilitated word of mouth. 
The lack of suitable identification variables for the Heckman selection model, and especially 
the lack of suitable control variables for the panel data estimations, complicated the empirical 
analysis and could have hindered the isolation of word of mouth effects. Considering the 
market share effects of word of mouth, the generalizability of the results reached here needs 
to be carefully considered as, while covering a geographically diverse set of markets, the 
performed analysis was based on data from only a single industry. Moreover, as the available 
data enabled the use of only a single independent variable in the panel data estimations, the 
robust identification of causality between word of mouth and market shares provides further 
challenges. 
The nature of word of mouth as a highly variable measure in terms of experiencing 
considerable variance between markets, products and time periods brings about considerable 
challenges to its analysis via econometric techniques. The empirical analysis in this thesis 
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attempted to control for some of these effects via imposing controls for some of these factors. 
Nevertheless, the time variant effects of product characteristic of the operation systems can be 
seen as possible factors influencing the estimation results, complicating the identification of 
the market share effects of word of mouth. As the product characteristics of the operation 
systems may experience considerable variation in time, the explanatory power of the models 
that do not take this into account can be seen as questionable. Hopefully future research 
utilizing methods that allow for the time variant effects to be controlled aid in further 
identification of the product market effects of word of mouth. 
7.3. Implications 
The field of social learning is still a young field in economics and new theoretical as well as 
empirical research is constantly expanding the bounds of our knowledge. One of the functions 
of this thesis is to act as a platform helping to guide future research in the field. As the precise 
effects of word of mouth advice in social learning are not yet conclusive, more research is 
needed to validate social learning theories in a real world environment. Based on the findings 
of this thesis, there is a variety of factors that can be seen as beneficial in aiding future 
research. Many of the biggest limitations of this thesis are related to the data available for 
empirical analysis. Richer datasets including larger amount of variables available for 
estimations than the datasets utilized here will without a doubt prove more beneficial in 
accurately isolating the effects of word of mouth and controlling for time variant variable 
properties among other relevant factors. 
In terms of the findings of this thesis, its contributions can be seen as one of the first attempts 
in empirical modeling the market effects of word of mouth. Armed with more diverse and 
suitable data, future research in the field will hopefully both broaden our understanding on 
how word of mouth facilitates social learning and what are its quantifiable real world 
implications. One of the most interesting avenues for further research is how the medium of 
transmission affects the effectiveness of word of mouth advice. As the internet, together with 
platforms such as social media, facilitate more and more advice transmission, the effects of 
these new channels to the age old phenomenon of social learning within a group invite further 
examination. 
Identifying the determinants of the effectiveness of word of mouth in affecting individual 
decision making and aggregating information between agents is essential for determining its 
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broader effects. The effective identification of word of mouth’s effect on the market behavior 
of consumers and companies alike will require more research to enable us to fully understand 
the mechanism of how the two are linked. As mentioned before, the availability of sufficient 
data to allow for diverse modeling will be of essence. Establishment of proof for robust 
causality between word of mouth and product sales will be the first step in this endeavor. 
From an economics perspective one of the important points of interest will also lie in how 
word of mouth affects company performance and market conditions. These two factors will 
hopefully be examined further in future research in the field. 
The objective of this thesis has been to contribute to the body of social learning literature by 
examining the effects of social learning and herd behavior by reviewing the extensive body of 
relevant literature and empirically investigating the determinants of the real world effects of 
word of mouth in social learning. Moreover, the thesis has especially aimed to contribute to 
the relative scarce body of literature empirically examining the real world market effects of 
word of mouth advice. As shown by both theoretical and empirical research, the social 
learning effects of word of mouth are extremely sensitive to numerous situation and learning 
environment specific factors. More research on the different determinants of learning 
outcomes in terms of sources of word of mouth and its delivery conditions is needed to 
broaden our understanding of word of mouth’s implications on individual agent behavior and 
on market outcomes. 
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Appendix 1. Countries and observations 
Table 6. Observations utilized in the estimation of the Heckman selection model 
Country Freq. Percent Cum.
Australia 8439 12.47 12.47
Brazil 2447 3.62 16.09
China 6203 9.17 25.26
France 7359 10.88 36.13
Germany 6581 9.73 45.86
India 2876 4.25 50.11
Indonesia 2948 4.36 54.47
Italy 6668 9.86 64.32
Mexico 2923 4.32 68.64
Nigeria 272 0.4 69.05
Russia 2928 4.33 73.37
Saudi Arabia 4673 6.91 80.28
UK 8402 12.42 92.7
USA 4941 7.3 100
Total 67660 100  
 
Table 7. Observations utilized in the estimation of panel data models 
Country Freq. Percent Cum.
Australia 72 7.14 7.14
Brazil 72 7.14 14.29
China 72 7.14 21.43
France 72 7.14 28.57
Germany 72 7.14 35.71
India 72 7.14 42.86
Indonesia 72 7.14 50
Italy 72 7.14 57.14
Mexico 72 7.14 64.29
Nigeria 72 7.14 71.43
Russia 72 7.14 78.57
Saudi Arabia 72 7.14 85.71
UK 72 7.14 92.86
USA 72 7.14 100
Total 1008 100   
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Appendix 2. Brand Relationship Tracker questions 
“When looking around for and choosing your current phone was your choice influenced by 
any of the following people…” 
- Your children, 
- Your friends 
- Your colleagues  
- Your parents 
- Your spouse or partner 
- Your brothers, sisters or cousins 
- Other 
“How would you rate your experience of getting guidance from other people when looking 
around for and choosing your current phone?” 
1 = Poor, 2 = Fair, 3 = Good, 4 =Very good, 5 =Excellent, 98 = Don’t know 
“Did you actively seek advice and guidance from people you know when choosing your 
current phone?” 
- Yes 
- No 
“How did you seek this advice and guidance?” 
- Face to face 
- Over the phone 
- Online using social media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter etc.) 
- By email 
- Online using instant messaging  
- Other 
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Appendix 3. Heckman selection model variables 
Table 8. Definition of variables used in the Heckman selection model 
Variable Definition
rating Rating given for advice
advice Dummy variable indicating whether advice has been received
active Dummy variable indicating if advice was active sought
children Dummy variable indicating if advice was received from children
friends  Dummy variable indicating if advice was received from friends
colleagues  Dummy variable indicating if advice was received from colleagues
parents  Dummy variable indicating if advice was received from parents 
spouse  Dummy variable indicating if advice was received from ones spouse
siblingsanandcousins  Dummy variable indicating if advice was received from siblings or cousins
gender Dummy variable for participants gender (male=1)
developedmarket Dummy variable for participants market (developed=1)
age25to39 Dummy variable for the participant to be aged from 25 to 39
age40to54 Dummy variable for the participant to be aged from 40 to 54
age55plus Dummy variable for the participant to be aged 55 or over
coreconsumer Dummy variable for the participant to be classified as a "core consumer"
via_face2face Dummy variable indicating if advice was received via face to face communication
via_phone Dummy variable indicating if advice was received via phone
via_some Dummy variable indicating if advice was received via social media
via_email Dummy variable indicating if advice was received via email
via_instmes Dummy variable indicating if advice was received via instant messaging
invmills Inverse Mills ratio calculated based on the selection equation  
 
Table 9. Summary statistics for variables used in the Heckman selection model 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
rating 42859 3.6725 0.9211 1 5
advice 67660 0.6467 0.4780 0 1
active 67660 0.4120 0.4922 0 1
children 67660 0.1453 0.3524 0 1
friends 67660 0.3710 0.4831 0 1
colleagues 67660 0.2440 0.4295 0 1
parents 67660 0.1260 0.3319 0 1
spouse 67660 0.3092 0.4622 0 1
siblingsanandcousins 67660 0.1953 0.3964 0 1
gender 67660 0.5203 0.4996 0 1
developedmarket 67660 0.6956 0.4602 0 1
age25to39 67660 0.4282 0.4948 0 1
age40to54 67660 0.2377 0.4257 0 1
age55plus 67660 0.1167 0.3210 0 1
coreconsumer 67660 0.0861 0.2805 0 1
via_face2face 67660 0.3458 0.4756 0 1
via_phone 67660 0.1082 0.3107 0 1
via_some 67660 0.0974 0.2965 0 1
via_email 67660 0.0397 0.1953 0 1
via_instmes 67660 0.0497 0.2173 0 1
invmills 67660 0.5576 0.1126 0.3059 0.7394  
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Appendix. 4 Variable specification tests 
Table 10. Ordinary least squares variable specification tests 
OS Android BlackBerry WP iOS
Dependent variable logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS
WOMratio 0.783 5.174*** 5.66 1.900**
(-1.326) (-1.742) (-6.929) (-0.861)
Constant -0.855*** -3.234*** -4.374*** -2.104***
(-0.152) (-0.531) (-0.771) (-0.413)
Observations 18 18 18 18
R-squared 0.021 0.355 0.04 0.233
OS Android BlackBerry WP iOS
Dependent variable logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS
WOMratio 1.506 0.548 -4.484 1.597
(-1.241) (-1.101) (-3.719) (-1.022)
Lagged logOSMS 0.668*** 0.837*** 0.964*** 0.185
(-0.194) (-0.129) (-0.138) (-0.241)
Constant -0.413* -0.475 0.449 -1.736**
(-0.209) (-0.49) (-0.783) (-0.632)
Observations 17 17 17 17
R-squared 0.498 0.836 0.786 0.219
OS Android BlackBerry WP iOS
Dependent variable logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS
Normalized WOMratio -0.441 -0.597*** -0.0958*** -0.0233
(-0.62) (-0.109) (-0.0147) (-0.155)
Constant -0.658*** -0.734*** -3.041*** -1.150***
(-0.151) (-0.179) (-0.158) (-0.251)
Observations 17 17 17 17
R-squared 0.033 0.668 0.738 0.001
OS Android BlackBerry WP iOS
Dependent variable deltalogOSMS deltalogOSMS deltalogOSMS deltalogOSMS
WOMratio 1.382 -0.276 -4.859 0.69
(-1.317) (-0.903) (-3.326) (-1.284)
Constant -0.143 0.0418 0.628 -0.329
(-0.146) (-0.274) (-0.372) (-0.62)
Observations 17 17 17 17
R-squared 0.068 0.006 0.125 0.019
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1. Dependent variable (logOSMS);  Independent variable (WOMratio )
2. Dependent variable (logOSMS ); Independent variables (WOMratio ) and lagged (logOSMS) 
3. Dependent variable (logOSMS ); Independent variable normalized (WOMratio )
4. Dependent variable one period change in (logOSMS ); Independent variable (WOMratio )
 
 89 
 
Table 11. Fixed effects variable specification tests 
Specification 1. Ratio 2. Lag 3.Normalized 4. Changes
Dependent variable logOSMS logOSMS logOSMS deltalogOSMS
WOMratio 3.634** -0.573 -1.104
(-1.128) (-1.491) (-1.468)
Lagged logOSMS 0.890***
(-0.0553)
Normalized WOMratio -0.0968***
(-0.00172)
Constant -2.758*** -0.0416 -1.586*** 0.296
(-0.282) (-0.474) (-0.00457) (-0.367)
Observations 72 68 68 68
R-squared 0.057 0.739 0.666 0.018
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Appendix 5. Heckman selection equation estimates 
Table 12. Heckman selection equation estimates 
gender -0.219*** 0.0105
developedmarket -0.361*** 0.0113
age25to39 -0.0814*** 0.0129
age40to54 -0.171*** 0.015
age55plus -0.204*** 0.0197
coreconsumer 0.0742*** 0.0179
Constant 0.877*** 0.0125
Number of observations
Log likelihood
Chi2
Prob > chi2
Pseudo R2
Variable Coefficient Standard error
Model statistics
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
67050
-39753.921
1743.93
0
0.0215
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Appendix 6. Market share and word of mouth correlations 
Table 13. Correlations between market shares and word of mouth 
Android BlackBerry WP iOS
Australia -0.368 0.702 0.198 -0.241
Brazil 0.164 0.509 0.063 -0.419
China -0.088 0.371 -0.194 0.057
France -0.037 0.659 0.347 -0.164
Germany -0.056 0.284 -0.529 0.006
India 0.034 0.613 0.648 0.173
Indonesia -0.398 0.007 0.414 -0.260
Italy 0.245 0.711 0.132 -0.251
Mexico 0.410 0.793 0.161 -0.269
Nigeria 0.125 0.208 0.006 0.435
Russia -0.153 0.175 0.451 -0.061
Saudi Arabia 0.437 -0.061 -0.178 0.303
UK 0.146 0.596 0.200 0.483
USA 0.297 0.702 0.127 0.592
Correlations between (logOSMS ) and (WOMratio ) in each country for each operation system
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Appendix 7. Model specification tests 
Table 14. Wald test results 
Country F-statistic Prob > F
All 552.420 0.000
Australia 125.24 0.000
Brazil 182.15 0.000
China PRC 671.5 0.000
France 311.63 0.000
Germany 401.06 0.000
India 106.68 0.000
Indonesia 376.39 0.000
Italy 135.78 0.000
Mexico 79.27 0.000
Nigeria 139.11 0.000
Russia 850.71 0.000
Saudi Arabia 439.96 0.000
UK 117.6 0.000
USA 155.88 0.000  
 
Table 15. Hausman test results 
Country Chi-squared Prob>Chi-squared
Australia 0.09 0.764
Brazil 0.09 0.758
China 0.02 0.894
France 0.07 0.792
Germany 0.17 0.681
India 2.57 0.109
Indonesia 0.56 0.456
Italy 0.01 0.942
Mexico 0.05 0.828
Nigeria 1.81 0.179
Russia 0.12 0.726
Saudi Arabia 0.15 0.696
UK 0.01 0.911
USA 0.16 0.686  
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Table 16. Breusch Pagan Lagrange multiplier test results 
Country Chi-bar-squared Prob>Chi-bar-squared
Australia 430.19 0.000
Brazil 472.31 0.000
China 570.76 0.000
France 526.74 0.000
Germany 539.06 0.000
India 326.94 0.000
Indonesia 524.87 0.000
Italy 442.49 0.000
Mexico 358.63 0.000
Nigeria 386.82 0.000
Russia 573.33 0.000
Saudi Arabia 543.75 0.000
UK 422.36 0.000
USA 452.29 0.000  
 
